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Abstract
TIle purpose of this study was to investigate the role interest groups played in the Newfoundland
education refoons of the 1995-1997-time period. The demise of the church-based school S)'1item
in Newfoundland during the 19905 has many wondering what happened to cause such a dramatic
tumofevenlS.
This paper argues thaI investigating the interest groups during Ihat tumultuous period may best be
vicwed within the naturalistic paradigm rather than the positivistic paradigm. Thus, the
qualitative methodology underlies this case study. The theoretical framework is based upon Ihe
pluralist/policy comnlUnitytheories and, in panieular, the work of A. Paul Pross.
Key to Ihis study of the influence interest groups had on the educational reform was the
deteonination oflheir potential capacity to influence government. As Pross puts it, were the
groups fully "institutionalized"? The determining variables as 10 whether a specific group was
instilution31ized are based upon Pross's ··Continuum Framework," which is explained within the
Ihesis
This thesis concludes that while Pross's work was helpful, his theory has to be extended to
include the role thaI individu31 key players have on the process of public policy. This research
suggesls that while for decades inleresl gTOUps sought to move the Newfoundland Government
away from a denominational-based school system. no changes were forthcoming until a political
leader arrived with the ·'courage" to bring the matler onto the public agenda. Once on the pUblic
agenda, school refoTiIl began 10 take a life of its own - politicians were often unable to control the
process.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Research Context: Education Reform 10 Newfoundland and the Issues At Hand
This study examines the 1990s transfonnation in Newfoundland of a multi-church
public school system to a single secular public school system. Churches that once held
the car of the Provincial Government in matters of education arc today watching from the
sidelines. It begs the question, "Why did this happen?"
Over four years have passed since the September 2, 1997 referendum, wherein 73
percent of those who voted, voted in favor of removing the churches from running the
schools. The events that led up to that watershed are a remarkable story of different
interest groups plotting and strategizing. and in some cases colliding with each other to
gain a position or influence on the Newfoundland Govemmem's education policy. The
study includes an assessment ortbe political COnlext of the education refonn, an analysis
orthe different groups in the policy community, and in the policy process itself. The
study involved interviews with actors in the community, and analysis of public comments
and briefs to the different govemment commissions and legislative committees.
This study is limited to the events between 1989-1998. During that time frame. the
educational system mutated from one with quasi-church comrol and influence to a purely
secular system. The very public debate and maneuvering of govenunent and the
interested parties centred around the rights of churches as framed in Tenn 17 of the
confederation agreement between Newfoundland and Canada in 1949. Three churches,
in panicular, sought to maintain those rightS in the face of a growing number of interested
parties opposing them. The body politic became engrossed with this single issue for
several years, with no probable end in sight until the referenda of 1995 and 1997. This
thesis reviews the winners and losers in the process and comes to the conclusion that
without the strong personalities leading government, the change would not have occurred
as quickly as it did.
Chapter 1 outlines thc conflict between, on the one hand, the government and the
education professional organizations, which preferred a single secular school system for
the province, and, on the other hand, churches, such as the Roman Catholic, Pentecostal,
and Scventh-day Adventist Churches that sought to preserve their established rights of
control and influence in their separate school systems. The chapter introduces the
research goals and objectives and the research design. The scholarly and practical
significance of the research to the field of public policy follows.
W.I. Jenkins defines public policy as "a set ofintcrrelatcd decisions" taken by
political actors within their power to act "concerning the selection of goals and the means
of achieving them within a specified situation."1 These political decisions are often very
difficult to make since they involve a multitude of interests that must somehow become
synthesized. Within the political mixing bowl arc conflicting values, rights and
obligations of the different panics seeking an input on the decision making process. It is
as Gilles Paquet described it, "a complex, messy and ill-understood process that evolves
through time as participants, perspectives, situations, and base values change."l
rhe values ofa community arc reflcctcd in the policy-making process. [ndividuals
or groups of individuals carry their values with them. In any community, different values
will contlict. The more diverse the community, the more values conflict as the people
reprcsenting thc different values compete for influence. Churehes holding the
educational rights dominated education policy in Newfoundland's past. However, during
the I99Os, different groups with different values sought to influence public policy on the
issue. The conflict ohalues became front and centre of the struggle.
With education being such a pivotal instrument of inculcating a community's
values, it is not surprising that it attracted so much attention from "public interest
groups". As will be discussed later this thesis defines "public interest groups" as
groupings of people who use their resources, whether reputation, money, etc., to
influence government on public policy! On the one side, churches with enshrined
constitutional rights to a publicly funded educational system wanted to keep the status
quo. These churches included, the Roman Catholic, Pentecostal, Seventh-day Adventist,
Anglican, United, Salvation Anny and Presbyterian churches. On the other side. was a
government backed by a number of different public interest groups intent on gelling rid
of the multiple systems of education favoring a single publicly funded system without
any church involvement. These groups included. the Newfoundland & Labrador
Teachers Association, Federation de parent francophone de Terre-Neuve et du Labrador,
Yes Means Yes Committee, Newfoundland and Labrador Home and School Federation,
Newfoundland and Labrador Human Rights Association, and St. John's Board of Trade.
By the I960s, Newfoundland's education system came under close scrutiny by
human rights advocates. Teachers were resentful of having their positions put in
jeopardy simply because of lifestyle decisions such as marrying someone outside of their
religious tradition. Parents C{)mplain~d that their children had to go to a school farther
away from home beeause they were not of the same religious persuasion as the local
school. By the late I980s, such arguments were becoming more vocaJ as opinion polls
continued to show the public being more fC\:eptive of changing the system. With the
election of Clyde Wells as Premier in 1989 on a platform to review the education system,
the groundwork was set for a conflict in public policy not seen since the 1948 debates on
confederation with Canada.
[n 1990, the Wells government appointed a Royal Commission to study the
educational system. The terms of reference for the Commission included the subject of
denominational control over education. For the churches still running Iheir own school
systems, the Commission was a rude awakening. Their worst fears were being realized.
The Newfoundland & Labrador Teachers Association and the Newfoundland & Labrador
Human Rights Association, who had both been advocating change for years, sensed that
finally change and ultimate victory was in the offing. But even they did not think it
would go so far, so quickly.
This study examines the pro and anti forces and their activities to influence
Newfoundland's education policy. Since the issue of who controlled the schools was the
epicenter of the debate, it is the one common theme that runs throughout the research.
The study assesses the political environment and the relative infiuence of the different
groups in the policy community through the means of gauging the actions of the actors to
events as they unfoldt:d during the debate.
While the pro and can forces fought a heated battle, the final outcome came down
to public opinion. The public demande<:l change. The interest groups on both sides
sought change that renected their own intereslS and biases. The interest groups worked
within the policy-making community, making presentations to goverrunent commiuees,
educating the public, and meeting with the individual govenunentleaders. However, as
this study poinlS out, the odds were against the churches and their supporters for a
number of reasons. Newfoundland demographics had changed; the policy community
had become more cohesive and decidedly against the ehurch run system; there was a lack
of long-tenn and persistent advocacy; there was the inability to mobilize a complacent
constituency; and there was a failure to recogni;ce the determination of Premier Clyde
Wells.
1.2 Research Goals and Objectives
The primary goal of this study is to contribute to an understanding of the public
interest groups in the education policy community and their role in the policy-making
process. Given that there is not a lot of academic literature about Newfoundland's
education policy-making, this study hopes to compliment the study of Mark Graesser, a
political science professor at Memorial University of Newfoundland. Graesser has been
taking public opinion surveys on education refonn in Newfoundland for over twenty
years. He recently has written at least two very helpful articles on the subject.4 This
thesis builds on Grat:sser's studies and moves the discussion fOr\vard, gclting behind the
scene of what happened. Not only will it serve an academic purpose but also inform
participants in the education policy community how public policy is made in the
Province.
The central research qucstion and subsidiary research questions are designed to
determine the primary influencers on the govemment regarding educational policy. The
questions are directed at examining the strengths and weaknesses of the various interest
groups and assessing thcir relative success in influencing policy. The answers to these
questions should lead us to a description of how the education policy process unfolded.
Thc attempt to answer the central question of "What interest groups had the primary
influence on the Newfoundland government's move to reform the educational system?"
is intended to find out what wenl on during the 19&9·199& education policy crisis. To do
this, the study took a broad approach and investigated the questions outlined below.s
From these questions, the policy making process became clear and so did the various
groups' influence or lack thereof. The questions were:
• Whtlt were the stages of the policy process for the educational system?
• Who were the principal actors in the education community?
• Where did those actors fit within the education community?
• What were the institutional characteristics that indicated a group's potential for
influencing the policy process?
• How did the actors attempt to influence the policy process?
• How did the actors relate to one another in the policy commWlity?
• How did the actors perceive themselves?
• What role did the actors' play in the education policy-making process?
• What was the outcome of the policy making effort in relation to the different
actors goals?
• How successful did the actors appear to be in influencing the educational
process?
1.3 Rc~carch Dc.sign
To answer these que~tion~, a naturalistic study6 was designed, using qualitative
methods for data gathering and analysis. The researcher approached this in two phases.
First, information from the popular press: newspaper accounts, radio reports, and
television was gathered. Also gathered was infonnation from the testimony given to
legislative committees and debates within the Newfoundland House of Assembly and the
two Houses in the Canadian Parliament.
Secondly, members of the government, interest groups and churches were
interviewed. These interviews were open-ended yet geared to answering the research
questions. The interviewees were encouraged to discuss what concerned them about the
events of education reform. This allowed for any unanticipated data - of which there
1.4 Academic and Practical Significance
Thomas Green notes that a policy question" .. is a request for a fairly stable, but
modifiable, line of action aimed at securing an optimal adjustment of the conflict between
different goods, all of which must be pursued, but which., taken together, cannot all be
maximized.,,7 In the area of education public policy, the competition between the
different interested panics is fierce. One cannot be surprised by the heightened emotion
in this area of public policy, given the very nature of education in society. It is the
education system that is given the task of perpetuating society's values and hopes for the
future generations. As Leonard Williams stated in his repon,
Perhaps more than any other institution the educalion system is tied to the society
and the world which shapes it and wllich it, in tum, comes to define. Education
does not and cannot exist in a vacuum - or an ivory tower - oblivious to change,
because it is such a fundamental cornerstone of our society and therefore of the
legacy we leave to coming generations. The education system here, or anywhere
that adequately prefares youth for the future, cannot be compromised by an insular
view of the world.
Policy questions are "always practical questions, never theoretica1.'.\! They provide a
framework for action. Often, the imerested parties arrive at agreement on what to do
without having agreed on the reasons for doing it. A number of distinctively different
parties came together to reform the education system in Newfoundland. There developed
a consensus by late 1997 that churches had to be removed altogether. The policy
question became "How should we eliminate the churches from education?" not "Should
we eliminate the churches from education?"
For interest groups with concerns in education policy. the experience of
Newfoundland provides a practical example of education policy-making by a provincial
government. Such knowledge of the policy community and its process will give interest
groups a heads up in their attempts to influence education policy.
For the academic, this study allows for further analysis of public interest group
theory of A. Paul Pross. While this study shows that Pross's contention that a group's
level of institutionalization affects their influence on public policy, it also suggests that
Pross's theory is not the last word and needs to be expanded. Other factors besides
institutionalization come into play - such as the groups' alignment with the views of
determined political actors to obtain what they subjectively view as what is best for the
body politic; and whether a group's views are in line with the public sentiment.
References
, W.I. Jenkins. Policy Analysis: A Polilical and Organi.fatirmal Per,'pec/iV/!. (New York: St. Martin's
I"ress.1978),p.15.
2 Gilles Paquet. "Policy A~ Proces~; Tackling Wicked Problems:' in Essays On Canadian Public Policy,
edited by T. Courdlelle and A. Stewan, (Kingston, Ontario: School of Policy Studies, Queen's University,
1991),p.J73.
'SeesectionJ.8foradetaileddiscussionon"ptJblicinterestgroups."
• Mark W. Graesser. "Education Reform In Newfoundland, 1990-1995: The Impact of Constitutional
Constraints and Referendum Politics," Preparcd for the Annual Meeting ofThe Canadian Political Science
Association. Memorial University of Newfoundland, June 10, 1997. and Mark W. Graesser. "Church,
Slate, And Public Policy In Ne\\foundland: The Question Of Denominational Education." Prepared for the
Annual Meeting ofThe Canadian Political Science Association. University of Victoria, May 27-29, 1990
l I should poill! out that these questions ilIll ba~ically the same fonnat as those used in other similar case
studies. In helping me 10 frame my own thinking and approach to this study the work ofCheryl Cowan
Buchwald, "Canada's Coalition For PubHc Information: A Case Study Of A Public Interest Group In The
Information Highway Policy-Making Process:' (University ofToronto, 1(99) was most helpful. The
questions and questionnaires in her study \\"t're adapted for my study. Those seeking to use the case study
approach as I did here will find Buchwald's work very helpful
6 This is di~cussed further in the next chapter.
1Thomas F. Green. "Policy Questions: A Conceptu.al Study.~ f.ducaliQll Policy Analys~ Archives, April
15. 1994, Vol. 2, No.7 (a peer-reviewed scholarly electronic journal: http://olam.ed.asu.deulepaalv2n7)
• LeQnard Williams, Our Children Our Future.- The Nayal Commiuioll a/Inquiry Into the Delil>ery 0/
Programs and Services in Primary, f.lemc,,'ary, S<:condary £dum/ion, (St. John's: Government of
Newfound\and&Labrador,1992),p.xviii.
• Thomas F. Green. "Policy Questions: A Conceptu.al Study.~ hup:/lolam.ed.asu.deulepaalv2n7.
10
CHAPTER 2
METHODOLOGY
2.1lntroduclion
This chapter deaJs with the methodology used for the ~1udy of public interest group
influence on Newfoundland's education policy during 1989-1998, An argument is made
for the acceptance of the naturalistic paradigm and an analysis of the difTereni qualitative
methodologics. Finally, this chapter will present the research design and the method of
data collection used in the study
2.2 Conceptual Framework
Reviewing the appropriate means to attempt this study, the researcher chose to
tackle the research question within the naturalistic paradigm, using the qualitativc
methodologies of case study. panicipant observation, grounded theory and extended case
method.
2.2.1 The Naturalistic Paradigm
While positivism seeks to predict and control, naturalism attempts to understand,
describe, respond to problems and determine status. I The naturalist approach studies the
whole context (or natural setting) in which the event occurs, and how people being
studied act. This is done not through a scientific instrument but rather through the
investigator who is the primary research instrument, and is charged "'lith deciphering
human behavior within the given context of study. By questioning the human players,
II
the investigalOr is capable of appreciating the multiple realities and fonning insights from
experiencc that a nonhuman instrumcnt would not?
Paul Atkinson and Martyn Hammersley argue that the concern of natural sciences
lics in thc disc<Jvcry of universal laws, whcreas thc conccrn of human sciences lies in
understanding particular phenomena in their socio-historical contexts.) In this study of
public policy, we will consider the broader context ~ the interplay between the various
actors, keeping in mind their biases. Many of their biases resulted from the peculiar
hi~10rical dcvelopment of the Newfoundland education system. Newfoundland's history
created its own stereotypes and myths that influenced government policy right up to the
1989-1998 time period. It is the researcher"s contention that such stereotypes and myths
would in alllikdihood fail to be detected from a positivist approach. Egon Guba and
Yvonna Lincoln maintain that human behavior is unlike physical objects since it "cannot
be understood without reference to the meanings and purposes attached by human actors
to their activities. Qualitative data, it is asserted, can provide rich insight into human
behavior.',4 Perhaps the best example found in this study was Premier Clyde Wells's
extreme caution in his approach to limit church involvement in the school system. His
fear was based on his belief that the churches could politically mobilize the public against
the government. His fear proved to be unfounded - as was discovered by Premier Brian
Tobin.
One must be cognizant of the criticisms of the naturalistic paradigm uscd in this
study. For instance, Earl Babbie is of the view that "conclusions drawn from qualitative
field research are often regarded as suggestive rather than definitivc."s Since a single
12
investigator interprets the events being studied, comparative evaluations and not just
descriptive evaluations should be employed to measure the reliability of the findings.
Given that it is the~ingle investigator, the interpretations are less reproducible and.
therefore, less generalizing can be gleaned from the study. No two situations are exactly
the same.
Though these criticisms are valid, the naturalistic approach provides us an
acceptable tool to understanding the phenomena of public policy in studying such events
as the Newfoundland education crisis. Within this conceptual arrangement, we can begin
to piece together the story of why things changed so rapidly in the Newfoundland
education system. It is the preferred approach to getting behind the story to discover why
the changes occurred when they did - what moved the Government of Newfoundland to
act
2.2.2 Qualitative Methodology
The naturalistic study requires tools to accomplish its task. Those tools can be
found in the qualitative method. This method provides us "a means for describing and
attempting to understand the observed regularities in what people do, say and report as
their experience.'''' With the focus of attention on the perceptions and experiences of the
participanls, we arc concerned about what individuals say they believe, the feelings they
express, and the explanations they give of what happened. As Lawrence Locke notes.
'nle working assumption is that people make sense out of their experiences and in
doing so create their own reality. In qualitative research, understanding both the
13
content and construction of such multiple and contingent realities urc regarded as
central to answering the question, "What's going on here?,,7
The data to be used in this research included interview transcripts, newspaper
accounts, and Hansard transcripts. Since this study was not starting out with a hypothesis
but rather seeking to make sense of what happened, the researcher collected as much
information as possible from the various players and then analyzed, or interpreted, what
happened. The gathering of information included case study, grounded theory, and
extended case method.
2.2.3 The Case Study
Whilc a case study reports a phenomenon within the naturalistic inquiry, it must be
seen as a part of the overall puzzle, attempting to generalize what occurred. It seeks to
have the reader vicariously experience the event being studied so that they can in tum
draw their own conclusions.8 The case study narrows the information gathering to one
event, or subject. In this study of the Newfoundland education policy our time was
limited to the 1989-98 era. The researcher sought to find out about a number of different
participants and their role in the drama. In eHect, there were several "mini-case studies".
2.2.4 The Grounded Theory
The concept of "grounded theory" comes from the work of Barney Glaser and
Anselm Strauss.9 Perhaps the best way to describe this concept is to contrast it to lhe
goal of quantitative methodology that seeks to prove pre-cxisting theories from the
collected data ofa study. Whereas grounded theory allows theories to emerge from the
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data - there arc no preconceived theories of how the relationships ought to transpire.
Strauss states that grounded theory is:
one that is inductively derived from the study of the phenomenon it represents.
That is, it is discovered, developed, and provisionally verified through systematic
data collection and analysis of data pertaining to that phenomenon. Therefore, data
collection, analysis, and theory stand in reciprocal relationship with each olher
One docs not begin with a theory, then prove it Rather, one begins with an area of
study and what is relevant to that area is allowed to emerge. IO
While Ihe grounded theory approach has some merit, the researcher is of the view
Ihat one must not be exclusive. There is a lot that can be gleaned from taking inlo
account Ihe existing literature in public policy. For Ihis reason, the extended case method
is seen as the appropriate approach to studying the primary influence on the
Newfoundland government to rcfonn the education system.
2,2,5 The Extended Case Method
The "extended case method" allows the investigator to enter the field with a
background knowledge of the litemture and, thus, with some expectations of what will be
found. At the same time the investigator will look for the unexpected. Like grounded
theory, the extended case method uses comparative analysis, but unlike grOlUlded theory
it goes further by allowing the investigator to incorporate his expectations and existing
theory into his data analysis. It is a more balanced approach in studying phenomena than
simply sticking with the grounded theory approach.
Strauss and Corbin explain "the interplay of reading the literature and doing an
analysis of it, then moving out into the field to verify it against realily can yield an
15
integrated picture and enhance the conceptuaJ richness of the theory...II They funher
state that:
if one is interested in extending an already existing theory, then one might begin
with the existing theory and attempt to uncover how it applies to new and varied
situations, as differentiated from those situations to which it was originally
applied. 12
When inconsistencies arise between the guiding theory and the case under study, it
allows for a possible reconstruction or extension of the theory at issue. Of course, this
could only be if the inconsistency turned out to be more than just an anomaly and
suggested a growing pattcrn whcn compared with similar studies.
2.3 Research Design
As noted above, the research into the Newfoundland government's reform of the
education system best fits into the naturalistic paradigm. This study is one of public-
policy making and group characteristics that sought to influence the public agenda. The
qualitative methodology and techniques, therefore, make it an ideal fit. Techniques such
as interviews, grounded theory, and extended case method helped anchor and guide the
study along. Thus as the data from the interviews, and other research was compared with
relevant theory, it allowed for an extension of the theory - within the framework of the
rescarchqucstions.
2.3.1 Research Questions
A broad approach wa" takcn to answer the central question of "What interest groups
had the primary influence on the Newfoundland government's move to reform the
16
educationaJ systemT Keeping in mind that the intent was to detennine what motivated
the Newfoundland government to act on education reform when it did the following
questions were asked:
• What were the stages of the policy process for the educational system?
• Who were the principal actors in the education community?
• Where did those actors fit within the education community?
• What were the institutional characteristics that indicated a group's potential
for influencing the jXJlicy process?
• How did the actors' attempt to influence the policy process?
• How did the actors relate to one another in the policy community?
• How did the actors perceive themselves?
• What role did the actors play in the education jXJlicy-making process?
• What was the outcome of the policy making effort in relation to the different
actors goals?
• How successful did the actors appear to be in influencing the educational
process?
2.3.2 Researcher Expectations
It must be recognized that every researcher brings "baggage" with him into a
research project such as this one. The "baggage" is often the result of personal
experience and a prima facie knowledge of the literature. The "baggage" thereby creates
certain expectations of what the study will reveal.
The researcher was of the view that govemment considered issues in response to the
pressure that well organized and linanced groups brought to bear on government. That
government would then articulate the concerns of the interest group and seek to gauge the
public opinion on the matter. If government were convinced that such concerns were
also on the minds of the public, as evidenced through means of opinion polls, then it
would act accordingly. Thus one could hypothesize thai the Newfoundland government
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acted to refOlTIl the education system when it did as a result of political pressure from the
interested parties, such as the Newfoundland & Labrador Teachers Association and
school boards.
lt should be noted that, during the time under study, the researcher served as legal
counsel for the Seventh-day Adventist Church, one of the thrce churches (Roman
Catholic and Pentecostal being the other two) that sought to maintain their separate
publicly-funded school systems. As a resull, he was sympathetic to the positions of the
three churches in their attempts to influence government policy on the matter. Having
said that, the researcher seriously pursued objectivity throughout this study, with a
genuine interest in discovering what motivated the government of Newfoundland to act
when it did to change the system.
Also guiding the study was the policy community theory as expounded by A. Paul
Pross. Pross argued thai interest groups ability to influence public policy became more
probable in accordance with their development of institutional characteristics.
2.3.3 Data Collection
This research project involved data collection over a pcriod of 8 ycars. During the
years 1989-1998, articles from the local Newfoundland newspapers were collected;
interviews on radio and television were recorded; sittings of the different con~1itutional
committees of the House of Commons and Scnate wcre attcndcd; and finally telephone
interviews of a number of participants of the process were conducted. These interviews
were conducted during the winter and spring of2001.
IS
2.3.3.1 Participant Observation
By participating in the process the researcher was privy to matters not normally
available to an outside observer. The interaction of the players is seen first hand in the
natural setting. On several occasions, the researcher represented the Seventh.day
Adventist Church in meetings with the heads of the churches who had educational rights
under Term 17, and participated in meetings with the Premier and members of the
Priorities and Plmming Committee when they met with the heads of churches prior to the
1995 referendum. He also represented the Seventh-day Adventist Church at the hearing
of the Senate Committee in July 1996, held in S1. John's, and again belare the Special
Joint Committee of the House of Commons and the Senate in its Ottawa hearings in
November 1997.
Thc researcher attcnded only a few of these meetings. He did not have an "open
door" to attend the different stratcgy meetings that were held between the various players.
His attendance was primarily in a professional capacity - i.e. as legal counsel. Thus. any
condu.sions of these meetings may not be representative of the majority of the meetings
held between the players. However, it nevertheless helped to orient him to the important
questions to ask during the interviews for the study.
2.3.3.2 Interviews
The interviews in this study attemptcd to allow the individuaJ actors in the process
10 convey their own perceptions of their experience in education reform. While the
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interviews were structured in the sense the author had a set pattern of questions to ask,
they, nevertheless, had flexibility to allow the respondents to share items that one may
not have considered. As the interviews progressed, each interview tended to build on the
one previous. Lines of questioning opened new avenues and viewpoints that were not
originally thought of when the research began. Of course, the discovery of new
information is what makes naturalistic inquiry so rewarding.
Interviews are not without their problems. For instance, Ihe interviewer may be
biased toward a particular viewpoint being considered. Questions may be asked
inapproprialely resulting in answers that that are not helpful to the study, The
respondents may not cooperate or not tell the whole story - not telling Ihe Irulh - or
giving answers that they feci the interviewer wants to hear.
For this study, the following individuals were interviewed, using the questionnaire
attached as an appendix to this thesis:
Pastor Earle Batslone, of the Pentecostal Assemblies of Newfoundland, interviewed
on March 23, 2001.
George Morgan, represented the Seventh.day Adventist Church, interviewed on
March 26, 200 I.
Wayne Noseworthy, of the Newfoundland & Labrador Teachers Association,
interviewed on March 29, 200 I.
Janet Henley-Andrews, of the Alliance For Choice In Education, interviewed on
March 29.2001.
Chris Decker, former Minister of Education, interviewed on Aprill, 2001.
Bon Fagan. of the fanner Roman Catholic Education Council, interviewed on April
17,2001.
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Gerry Fallon, ofthc former Roman Catholic Education Council, interviewed on
April 19, 2001.
Len Williams, Chair of the Williams Commission, and Deputy Minister of
Education, interviewed on April 19,2001.
Phil Warren, fanner Minister of Education and Chair of the Warren Commission,
interviewed on April 23, 2001.
Ivan Morgan, of the Newfoundland & Labrador Human Rights Association,
interviewed on April 26,2001.
Ed Roberts, fonner Minister of Justice, interviewed on April 30, 2001.
Steve Wolinetz, professor at Memorial University, active with Yes Means Yes
Committee and Education First, interviewed on July 23, 2001.
One of tile limitations of the study was the failure to interview a number of key
individuals, including; Clyde Wells, Brian Tobin, Roger Grimes, and representatives
from the Home and School Federation, and from the Presbyterian, United, Salvation
Army and Anglican Churches.
Several attempts to arrange such interviews were made. The researcher regretted
very much not being able to interview Clyde Wells, who more than any other person,
who more than any other person received the scorn and the praise from the respondents,
depending, of course, on which side they took. The respondents agreed to the interviews
being taped. This allowed greater accuracy in analyzing the data.
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CHAPTER 3
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
3.1 Introduction
Chapter three provides the theoretical framework that guided this study. With such
a huge undertaking, it was al times difficult to narrow the study. However, the work of
Pross provided the means to guide the study. Public policy is an ever growing and
demanding field that has both academic and practical implications. For the study at hand,
it was important to view the literature and make an appropriate decision on the
framework to follow.
3.2 Public Policy
While there is much academic discussion about what constitutes "public policy,"
Thomas Green presents a helpful definition. Green states,
A policy questioll is a request for a fairly stable, but modifiable, line of
action aimed at securing an optimal adjustment of the oonflict between
different goods, all of which must be pursued, but which, taken together,
cannot all be maximized. We do not have a well-formed policy question or a
fully fonnulated statement ofa policy problem until we can state the set of
values or goods from which the question arises, and do so, moreover, so as
to reveal their mutual inconsistency. I
William Jenkins defines public policy as,
A sel ofioterrelated decisions taken by a political actor or group ofacto11l
concerning the selections of goals and the means of achieving them within a
specified situation where these decisions should, in principle, be within the
power of these actors to achieve. l
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G. Bruce Doern points out thai the public policy system is an mnalgam and
interplay of idea.v; .l"lrUC(Ures headed by elected and appointed individuals who are
involved in "ranking, balancing and allocating scarce resources of money, personnel,
political energy and time; and proce.fses. ,,) Within the discipline of political science, the
arguments over public policy, as Robert Jackson and Doreen Jackson present, involve the
inlen/ions of politicians, the actions and inaClions of government and the impact of
government.4
Certainly, "anyone contemplating the study of public policy for the first time has a
right to feel somewhat bewildered.,,5 Perhaps the confusion comes from the inter-
disciplinary nature of public policy. No single academic discipline can claim dominance.
By its very nature, public policy questions affect different subject areas at the same time.
On the praclicallevel, more often than not, a public 1Xl1icy issue faced by government
involves sevcml arcas of rcsponsibility. As with our current study of education, the
Department of Education in Newfoundland was not the only department afft..-cted - so
was the Department ofFinanee, the Department of Justice, and so on. The crossovers in
thc practical considerations also have academic crossovers.
Thus, students of public policy are faced with academic discussions that involve "a
minefield of both intra-and interdisciplinary quarrels and controversies, some important
and substantive, but others trivial and frustrating for both the novice and the seasoned
readeralike.',6
For the purposes of this thesis, the Jackson and Jackson definition was most
helpful: '·public policy is the broad framework within which decisions are taken and
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action (or inaction) is pursued by governments in relalion to some issue or problem,'" In
studying public policy, the student is looking for answers to either one or more of the
following: how, why, and to what effect. dilferent governments pursue pm1icular courses
of action or inaction,K
In studying the education refonn of 1989-1998, the researcher was interested in
why the Newfoundland government acted. Was it the result of pressure from the
interested parties in the education system; was it the result of a particular leader's view of
what was in the public interest; or was it the result ofa public groundswell of demands
forrefon"?
Students of public policy have uscd a number of broad approaches in their attempt
to simplify reality or make sense of the subject at hand. Micro-level approaches to public
policy analysis are intended to explain individual decisions within the broad spectrum of
puhlic policy. Micro-level approaches include: The Rational Model and The
Incremental Model.
Macro-level approaches to public policy analysis focllS on the wider relationship
between state and society. Not so much interest in how individual decisions are made
within government but on the wider relationship of the state and society. These include:
The Public Choice Model, and The Class Analysis Model.
3.3 The R.ational Model
The rational approach views the publie poliey process as a series of reasoned
decisions. There are two streams of thought in this model. The first is that the decision
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maker faced with a problem will decide what is the most ctfcctivl: and efficient means of
achieving the end.Q It is a utilitarian point of view of maximizing the resources where the
biggest bang for tbe buck can be garnered. The decision makers are seen to make
decisions in the following predictable manner:
identifying the problem or objective;
examining the alternative means, costs and benefits involved in solving
he problem;
selecting and choosing the best way;
implementing the decision; and
evaluating the degree of success and then changing one's behaviour to
correcterrors. lO
The second stream of thought in this model is the scientific method. It attempts 10
establish a causality, to establish "the facts," and to distinguish facts from values.
TIle mtional model is criticized today as not properly explaining the reality of
public policy process - the behaviour of the actors involved. Critics argue that it makes
unreasonable demands on the decision-makers. How is it possible, they say, for a cost-
benefit analysis of cvery issue, of every alternative course of action? It is simply
impractical. Another criticism is that the approach is not a description of the process but
a prescription of how people should think and how decisions ought to be made. I \
3.4 The Incremental Model
This model, developed by Dahl and Lindblom, arose in response to the rational
model. 12 They suggest the decision-making process does not involve some ideal goal to
be attained in the most efficient manner, but rather pubLic policy decisions are made in
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reference 10 what is already in place. Such decisions implement policies and programs in
stages, or incrementally over time. Emphasis is placed on agreement and consensus - a
good policy must not only give good results but those involved must come to a consensus
on the matter. As people arc often resistant to change. any program or policy to be
successful musl be incremental. Thus, incrementalism claims to have solved the problem
of inadequate information and uncertainty of the rational model as existing policies and
programs can be easily reversed or altered rather than the wholesale cltanges as suggested
by the rational model.
Of course. the incremental model is not without its critics. Many argue that while
there is evidence to suggest that the incremental model may explain what happens in a
number of situations, it is not the way decisions should be made. This is problematic.
some argue, since it is too conservative - it maintains the status quo. I)
3.5 The Public Choice Model
This model is one of the macro-level approaches 10 public policy analysis. It sees
public policy from a self·interested economic point of view. Decision makers are not so
concerned with the pursuit of public interest as they are al seeking the maximum benefit
from their own narrow self-interest. 14 This approach has its origin in the classical liberal
thinkers such as Adam Smith. There is almost a food chain analogy to the public policy
process. Voters arc at the bottom - they only have a limited say from time to time when
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the political actors allow them to become involved The central actors are special interest
groups, bureaucrats, and politicians.
While the model focuses on the individual. individuals often group together to
bener their interests. "They do so," say Jackson and Jackson, "only when collective
action promises greater rewards than a(;ting alone and when the benefits of collective
action outweigh the costs of group participalion."ls The groups that develop from time to
time are not necessarily equal. Some groups \\'ill have more resour~s than others
depending upon the make up of their membership. Finally, this model does not see
government as a neutral arbiter between the groups. Rather government, i.e. politicians
and bureaucrats, will assist those groups who have the ability to give the maximum
benefit Politicians will support policies of the marginal voters in order to increase the
likelihood of re-election. Meanwhile, bureaucrats use their information and position in
any way they can to increase their budgets and expand their departments.
3.6 The Class Analysis Model
This model is also known as the nco-Marxist Model. It has its origins in the
writings of Karl Marx concerning the relationships among the economic, social and
political institutions of society. Marx postulated that all stages of historical development,
social and political, are dctcnnined by the class structurc. The antagonism between thc
capitalist class. or bourgeoisie. that owns and controls the means of production and the
working class, or proletariat, that sells its labour to the capitalists. Capitalists, according
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to Marx, exploit the labour of the working class to create more capital for further
investment and greater accumulation of wealth.
In capitalist societies, according to this view, it is the role of government to protect
the capitalist class by creating a favourable environment for the accumulation of wealth.
To prevent a revolution of the proletariat, the capitalist governments have to maintain
conditions of social hannony with policies that legitimize the system in the eyes of the
working class. Thus, public policy decisions are performing one of two functions-
accumulation function or legitimizotion function. Leo Panitch adds a third function -
coercion - to otherwise maintain or impose social ordcr. 16 Accumulation functions
would include tax breaks for businesses and protection of private property. Social
policies such as welfare, universal healthcare would be legitimating functions. The
military, police and such would be examples of the third group - the coercion function.
In reviewing the public policy decisions ofthe liberal democratic governments, this
modcl views them as maintaining thc status quo - ensuring that thc working class is kept
in its place. This has led to some of the criticisms of this model. It could be argued that
even in socialist states the socialist owners of capital can view the public policy decisions
as accumulative, legitimizing, or coercive. 17
3.7 The Pluralist Model
TIle pluralist model emphasizes political actors and organizcd intcrests in thc public
policy process. Unlike the class analysis approach, pluralists do not sec society divided
into classes jockeying for position but rather see society divided into multiple groups
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seeking to gain influence on the public policy. For pluralists, politics is the means
through which individuals and groups organize into different groups according to their
interests, ethnicity, language, religion, gender and region, mobilizing and building
coalitions to exert pressure upon government to ensure that policy decisions are made in
their favour. Government in their view is a neutral arbiter thai seeks to referee the
various demands and make decisions on public policy that is in the best interests of the
public at large. Since coalitions and alliances vary from issue to issue, there are no
pennancnt winncrs and losers in thc group struggle. IS
The critics of this mooel argue that it fails to address the incidents where some
groups "never get a fair hcaring for their interests because obstacles prevent them from
placing certain issues on the agenda.,,19 For example, it is harder for the poor and
working class to become organized than the business class because of limited resources.
"The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-
class accent. Probably about 90 percent of the people cannot get into the pressure (group)
system.,,20 j'kavily influenced by the pluralist thought is the policy community theory of
A. Paul Pross.
3.8 The Policy Community Model of A. Paul Pross
Guiding this study and giving it focus is A. Paul Pross's policy community model
that emphasizes the role of interest groups in the policy process. Jackson and Jackson are
of the view that Pross has given "the most satisfactory catcgorization of Canadian interest
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groups to date:.21 While Pross's model is based upon the Canadian federal governmenl.
that the model can and should be used in the examination of provincial public policy, as
is the subject of this study.
Pross defines "pressure groups" as "organizations whose members aCI together,
attempting to influence public policy in order to promote their common interest.,,22
These are distinct from "interest groups" who are more involved in activities of a non-
political nature with politics being only peripheral to what they are about. While Pross
has gone to some length 10 make the distinction, olher llterature appears to use the terms
interchangeably. For the purpose of this thesis. the leon "pressure group" and "interest
group" arc one and the same - groupings of people who use their resources. whether
reputation, money, etc., to influence government on public policy.
As noted above, Pross has developed his view within Ihe pluralist and policy
community theory of public policy making.23 The pluralists treat economic factors,
cultural and ideological differences, as sources of political conflict. Jackson and Jackson
tell us that the pluralist sees:
Politics [as] the process whereby individuals and groups seek to promote their
interests through organization, political mobilization and alliance-building in order
to influence the policy outputs of government. Political parties are seen as broad
coalitions ofintcrests, seeking legistlltive majorities in the electoral arena.
Govemment is viewed as a neutral arbiter that referees the group struggle,
adjudicates among competing group demands and implements and enforces public
policies in the national interest or, at least, according to the wishes of the majority
on each issue.24
According to Pross, though the policy process is hard to define, we can nevertheless
make somt: general observations. First, the entire political community is "almost never
Jl
involved in a specific policy discussion.',H Cabinet and the other decision-making
bodies are not accessible to everyone. This results in a spedalization throughout the
policy system where groups have to target and strategize as to where they will spend their
energies to seek influence. They specialize in their areas of expertise.
Second, out of the specialization come "policy commlUlities" - groupings of
government agencies, pressure groups, media people, and individuals, including
academics, who have an interest in a particular field and attempt to influence it. These
policy communities have two segments, according to Pross: the sub-government and the
attentive public, The sub-government is the policy-making body made up of government
agencies and institutionalized interest groups "whose power guarantees them the right to
be consulted on virtually a daily basis.',26
The attentive public, composed of those groups not in the inner circle, lacks the
power of the sub-government, but are still vital to the policy development. Within this
outer circle would be academics, journalists working for specialized publications and
other organizations "whose interest is keen but not acute enough to warrant breaking into
the inner circlc.',27 Their importance comes from the opportunities they create through
conferences and study sessions that allow for the cross fertilization of ideas between the
officials and the grass roots constituencies. Though they are quick to put their views
forwllrd, they are often trcllted patronizingly and with skepticism yet their agitation often
leads to a gradual change of policies and programs that meet the neoos of the community.
"The main function of the attentive public, then, is to maintain a perpetual policy review
process.',2&
32
Figure )·1 illustrates Pross's concept of the policy community in the Canadian
federal system. At the heart of the community are the key federal bodies: the agency
primarily rcsponsible for formulating policy and carrying out programs; cabinet with its
coordinating committees and their support structures ~ the Privy Council Office, the
Treasury Board, the ministries of state, etc. None of these occupy the centre sinec none
is consistently dominant, though the lead agency dealing with routine policy-making
tends to be most influential. Clustered around this inner circle are the pressure groups
and provincial government agencies, keeping their eyes on "the feds". Also involved are
other federal agencies that review the lead agency poliey and often alter it.
On thc edge of the sub-govcrrunent is Parliament - "perennially interested,
intermiuently involved, sometimes influential" - and the provincial government
agencies?' They may seek to be part of the sub government but lack the resources to
maintain a presence; olhers are just nol interested and are content to watch Irom the
sidelines until they feel an issue is of importance for thcm to act. The pressure groups arc
shown as overlapping - as they often share the same membership and combine efforts to
present a common stand to government.
On the outer edge are the foreign governments: Canadian politicians travel and are
influenced by international trends and conditions bringing home new ideas and
approaches that are then attempted locally.
Pressure groups, and individual members, says Pross. are the most mobile in the
policy community. Their annual meetings, newsletters, regional organizations and their
infonnal networks, allow them to cross organizational lines that are denied more formal
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actors like government departments. They act as "go-betweens, provide opportunities for
quiet meetings between warring agencies, and keep the policy process in motion." Thcse
services, combined with the ability to evaluate policy, and develop policy make pressure
groups an integral part orthe policy community,30
Finally, it is important to note that the major players in the policy community are
not primarily interested in making or refonnulating policy. They see the community as a
protective mechanism, limiting the opportunities for the public to achieve drastic
changes. The subgovemment's goal is keep policy-making at the routine or technical
level. This is challenged each time circumstances, beyond their control, generate more
conflict thcn they can handle. In such situations, more interests seek input and as
conflicts rise the central issues are eventually taken out of the subgovemment and policy
community - being resolved at the highest politieallevels - i.e. cabinet and first
ministers' conferences.
3.9 The institutionalization Continuum
To be effective in influencing government policy, the group must be
"institutionalized". The less a group is institutionalized the less its influcncc on policy-
and vice versa. It is so important says Pross, "because the environment is bureaucratic,
pressure groups have had to become increasingly institutionalized to work effectively in
it."3! Fully instilUtionalized groups are thosc·
Groups that possess organizational continuity and cohesion, commensurate human
and financial rcsources, extensive knowledge of those sectors of government that
affect them and their clients. a stable membership, concrete and immediate
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operational objectives associate<! with philosophies that are broad enough to penni!
[them] to bargain with government over the application of specific legislation or the
~;~~~~:n~h~~~~~i:~a~~rCe;l~ri;:~ic~~o~:i~i.~rnessto put organiUltional
The institutionalized group will know the government agency it seeks to influence,
how much power it has, how it works, who its rivals arc, and so on. Thus, it can deliver
to its constituency the policies that are so important to it on a more consistent basis than a
group that is not institutionalized.
Pross postulates a continuum or a progression of institutionalization as expressed in
the figure below. This continuum will assist this study in providing a benchmark for us
to compare the various interest groups that sought influence on the Newfoundland
educational reform. As noted in the Figure 3-2, the concept of institutionalization is a
process, a progression from a group that is "issue-oriented" or nascent to one that is fully
institutionalized.
Nascent groups spring up at a moment's notice reacting to a "government action or
a private-sector activity that only govemmem can change.',J) Usually, when their goals
are met, they disband. They have single, narrowly defmed objectives and have no paid
staff. In our study, groups such as the "Yes Means Yes Committee" and "Education
First" are examples of nascent groups.
Fledgling groups are those that have multiple but closely related objectives and are
capable of supporting a small staff. The Home and School Federation would be an
example of a fledgling group.
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Mature groups have multiple, broadly detined and collective objectives, onen with
alliances with other groups with prolessionals on staff. The Newfoundland and Labrador
Human Rights Association would be an example here.
Institutionalized groups not only have multiple, broadly defined collective and
selective objectives, but (hey have extensive human and financial resources. The various
churches and the Newfoundland and Labrador Teachers Association are examples in our
study.
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Figure 3-1 The Policy Community
Source: A. Paul Pross. "Pressure Groups: Talking Chameleons:'!Tom Michael S. Whittington and
Glen Williams Editors. Canadianpolilicsin the 199()s. Scarborough. ON: Nelson, 1995, p. 267.
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Figure 3-2 The Institutionalization Continuum Framework'u
The policy community model is most appropriate to creating a framework for the
investigation of the phenomenon of the Newfoundland education reform. It assisted in
idcntifying and analyzing relational variables by its description of the policy community
being split between the sub-government of decision makers and the attentive public. The
concept of institutional characteristics gives a benchmark to follow in the analysis of
determining which group had the potential to influence the Newfoundland govemment
and also to help in the determination whether Ihal potcntial was in fact realized.
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3.10 Conclusion
The policy community model of Pross, while drawing upon the principles of the
pluralist and the incrementalist models, provide this study an acceptable framework for
the investigation of the phenomenon of the Newfoundland education refoon. It allowed
the means for identification and analysis of relational variables. It described the policy
community as being split between the sub-government of decision makers and the
attentive public. The concept of institutional characteristics gave a benchmark to follow
in the analysis of dctcnnining which group had the potential to influence the
Newfoundland government and also to help in the detennination whether that potential
was in fact realized. By using this model the researcher has been able to fonnulate a
plausible answer as to why the Newfoundland government acted when it did to refonn the
education system.
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CHAPTER4
THE POLITICAL CONTEXT OF EDUCATIONAL REFORM IN
NEWFOUNDLAND
4.llntroduClion
This chapter outlines the historical, political and religious milieu that fonned the
background for the education debates in Newfoundland. It is my opinion that the actions
or inactions of the Newfoundland government during the 1989-1998 period can be best
understood with this historical background. While education refonn has seen "a vast
quantity of ink ... wasted on this vexed question" since the early nineteenth century,
there are a number of common themes that run throughout the debates. I History shows
an education system that was heavily influenced by church control, a political system that
sought compromise rather than raise the ire of denominational leaders and the possibility
of political violence over religiously contentious issues. It puts into perspective the
hesitancy of some politicians, even as late as 1989-1998, to move ahead with education
refonn. Perception of church powcr caused politicians including Clyde Wells to
approach education reform somewhat timidly. Without this historical sketch, it is
difficult to understand those hesitancies.
4.2 Origin and Development ofChureh Schools
Early settlers in Newfoundland formed religiously cohesive communities. Because
lhe British policy discouraged island settlement, there was no attempt to establish a
fonnal education process. Christian missionaries stepped in to fill the role as teachers.
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An Anglican minister, Kev. Henry Jones in Bonavista during 1722 or 1723, !>1arted the
first known schoo1.2 The early church-run schools were haphazard in the sense they were
only as good as those who taught and were open only as long as the teacher would
continue living in the area.
As the population ofthe colony grew, so too did the demand for self-
government. Finally, in 1832, an elected legislature was permitted. The Education Act
of 1836 provided limited funding to the schools that were already in existence and
established "common" schools in the outports under appointed school boards. Although
the government recognized some responsibility in providing education, it still left the
buildings and upkeep to local communities.> The overall design of the new govemment
was a common school that catered to a divided Catholic and Protestant population.
leaving religious instruction oul ofthe curriculum.4
For a time, the schools run by benevolent societies were non-denominational in
focus. Clergy were encouraged to keep out of school affairs. Even Bishop Flemming of
the Roman Catholic Church in St. John's was not permitted to give religion c1asses.s It
does not mean that the ministers did not try, as is evident by the amendment to the
Education Act in 1838 stating:
All ministers of Religion shall have power to visit the schools under
the control ofthc Boards of Education. Provided. nevertheless, that
no minister shall be permined to impart any religious instruction in
the school or in any way to interfere in the proceedings or
management thereof.6
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The Newfoundland School Society (NSS) approached Ihe thorny issue of religious
education by presenting" .moral religious duties without reference to particular
doctrines.,,7
However, the non-denominational character changed as the British Governors and
Protestant elite ancruptcd to ensure that "No Popery" took over the schools through
Catholic members on the school boards. The anti-Catholic sentiment led to demands
from the Anglicans that {he education grants be divided amongst the denominations.
They were "prepared to wreck the system rather than see the children of Catholic parents
silting side by side with their own."s Lines began to be drawn. Thus, the Anglican
Church began demanding control over the governmental educational grants.
In 1843, as the anti-Catholic bias continue<!, the government divided its educational
grants, based on population, between the Protestants and the Roman Catholic Church.
All the schools built under the previous Acts now came under the management of the
board belonging to the major denomination in the area. The government tried to establish
two denominational colleges in SI. John's but il was unacceptable 10 the Roman Catholic
Church which felt that it would not have sufficient control.
In 1844, the government attempted to establish a non-denominational school, but
this met with opposition from the hierarchies of both the Catholics and Anglicans.9 One
of the problems was the battle over the reading of the Bible in the schools. The Roman
Catholics were not in favour of Bible readings - if such readings were pennitted it was
only to be from the Roman Catholic Douay translation of the Bible. The Protestants, on
the other hand, insisted that the King James translation of the Bible be read. The
44
government responded by amending the Education Act banning reading from any Bible·
which only led to further debate. The bickering led to calls for funding of separate
schools.
Leading the charge for the Anglicans was Bishop Edward Feild. He was, "a
Tmctarian of unbending principles." He viewed the Anglican Church as divinely
appointed to lead mankind to salvation through the sacraments of baptism and eucharist.
As a fonner school inspector for the Anglican National Society in England, he believed
the Anglican Church should have a separate grant of public money for its own schools. 10
Roman Catholic Bishop Mullock stated that support for denominational schools
was "to give justice to all" and was the only way to "prevent bickering." He went on to
state:
In all coumries of mixed populations where the experiment had been tried of
either forcing on the minority the religious education ofthe majority, or of
excluding any definite religious teaching, and endeavouring to substitute for
it a system of ethics, under the name of 'Common Christianity,' it has
resulted in absolute failure. Religious dissensions, instead of being
eliminated, have become chronic...and infidelity and indifTerentism...have
not only undermined all governments, monarchical or democratic, but have
corrupted and endangered the fundamental principles of society itself by
nullifying parental authority, the indissolubility of marriage, the rights of
property, the dignity of man, and the honour of woman, - frightful evils.... !!
The Anglican Church demands for a further division of the Protestant grant on a pro
rata basis between it and other Protestant groups, panicularly the Methodist Church,
caused a lot of friction. 12 Many wcre worried that to fun her sulxlivide the money would
result in less pay for the teachers. What experienced teacher would work for less? In
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1852, the legblature allowed the Protestant portion to be divided on sectarian lines. But
this did not satisfy anyone.
Religious strife reached a climax in 1861 when Governor Banneman, feeling
insulted by Catholic Prime Minister John Kent of the Liberal Party, dismissed the
governmcnt and new elections were called. 13 The Protestant Conservative leader Hugh
Hayles won the election and was asked to fonn the new administration. Encouraged by
the bigotry between the Bishops of the Anglican and Catholic Churches, mob violence
erupted as the Ken! supporters' attacked the Colonial Building. Troops were called out
and the resulting gunfire left three dead with twenty wounded. Amidst the melee Bishop
Mullock had the bells in the Cathedral ring calling the faithful. The mob went from the
streets to the Cathedral. During the service Multock exacted a promise of good
behaviour and exposed for veneration the Blessed Sacrament. 14 The crowd soon settled
down.
Recognizing the futility of ruling through the military, and the indisputable facl of
the churchs' ability to raise havoc when it saw fit, the Conservatives in 1865 offered seats
in thc government to two of the most influential Roman Catholic politicians. I' This led
to a tradition of "sharing the spoils" amongst the Protestant and Catholics after each
election. 16 It became a settled rule in the formation of government that all religious
parties be fairly represented both in the administration and distribution of offices.
The political turmoil oflhe 1860s. together with fatigue over the education issue,
had its cITect. In 1874, the government finally gave in to a denominational school system
that was concocted amongst the religious elites before it came to government. The
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Anglicans and Methodists, after arguing for years OVt;:r the division oftht;: Protestant
grant, came to an agreement outside of the legislative assembly to further divide the grant
amongst the different sects. While the majority of the legislators spoke oul against the
proposal, they all voted for it, giving deference to the church leaders. It was passed, as
McCann notes for "politioo-religious rather than educational objectives." I? Protestants
and Catholics were treated alike. II
Just as the denominational education system was deepening its roots in
Newfoundland society, other countries at the bcginning of the "Christian Century" were
removing the governing role of churches in education. The English Education Acts of
1870 and 1902 gave tacit reoognition of the role of churches in religious education, but
they were assigned an inferior position vis-a-vis the state in controlling schools. 19 In
1900, the British Board of Education conducted a review of Newfoundland education and
found the system wanting.2°
In 1903, a new Education Act was passed which allowed non-denominational
sehools in outports where the population was too small for one denomination to open up
a school. Surprisingly, the measure passed with no opposition. The churches did not see
this as a threat as they felt it an aberration and that once the populations of the outports
increased it would return to the denominational pattem.21 This precedent would be useful
for the future establishment of schools in resource company towns where these
amalg.'lmated schools were the norm.
The reS()urce companies were not as concerned with denominational representation
as thcy wcre with cost-effectiveness of running a viable school. By 1920, nine such
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schools were established around the colony in such places as Orand Falls, Bell Island,
Buchans, Deer Lake, Comer Brook, Millertown and Badger. While they were meant to
be non-sectarian, they tended to be Protestant. Overall, they were generally larger, better
equipped, and with more highly educated teachers than the best denominational
schools.22
The Education Act of 1927 gave the churches control of education in four areas:
(1) the right to denominationally-based school boards which could own and operate
schools; (2) the right of these schools to appoint and dismiss tcachers; (3) the right of
these schools to receive puhlic funds on a non-discriminatory basis; and (4) the right to
establish denominational colleges.23
On February 16, 1934. Prime Minister Frederick C. Alderdice signed a document,
which surrendered dominion status of the bankrupt colony and once again Newfoundland
was ruled directly from London through what was called "Govcrnment By
Commissiont,.2~ In 1935, the Commission decided that the reorganization of the
educational system was on the top of the agenda. The Commission felt it was time that
Newfoundland catch up to the modem times and accept the concept of "state
education. ,,25 The denominational system was said to be "wrong in theory."
Proposals for legislative change included: a new curriculum: abolition of local
Boards of Education; and state schools in 51. John's for children unable to attend because
of lack of facilities. TIlese proposals gave government greater conlrol of the educational
system. The United Church accepted these proposals but the Roman Catholic and
Anglican Churches were adamantly opposed. They condemned the Commission for what
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they saw as its lack of consultation and openness. Both Churches warned of widespread
hostility if the proposed legislation was pa%ed. As a result of the religious animosity that
the proposed legislation created, the Commission gave in. This did not sit well with the
Dominion Office which declared that "... the denominational system is now more finnly
established than ever.,,26 Finally, the Dominion Office decided that in light of the attilude
of the Churches there was no alternative but to re-introduce the control of denominational
officers in the education system.21
During the 1948 Reterenda religious bigotry raised ils ugly head again as the
Roman Catholic Chureh sided with the anti-confederates while the Protestants sided with
Smallwood's confederates. There were two referendums necessary in 1948. The first
gave Newfoundlanders a choice between Responsible Government, Confederation with
Canada, and remaining under the British Commission of Govenunent. The first result
brought no clear winner. A second referendum was necessary to decide between
Responsible Government and Confederation with Canada. During the second campaign.
the religion card was played, which led to victory for Confederation. Given that there
were more Protestants than Roman Catholics. such a result is not surprising.
The Roman Catholic Archbishop Edward Patrick Roche caJled upon his faithful to
support Responsible Government. Perhaps he was fearful of losing status since as part of
Canada, he would be responsible to two cardinals rather than directly to Rome. There
could also have been some Celtic pride being displayed. Roche was raised in Dublin.
There can be little doubt that his Irish background gave him an aversion to Newfoundland
solidifying British tics by joining Canada. Canada's ways were so coarse and secular thaI
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they could only lead to a decline in church influence. Many of his supporters argue it
was simply his pastoral concern for his congregants - i.c. he did not want them to sutTer
the ills of Canadian secular society. "Kept isolated, the faith of Newfoundlanders was
secure. ,,28 For whatever reason, his outspoken support for Responsible Government led
to Newfoundland's worst sectarian politics of the 20th Century. For the first time since
the tumultuous events of 1861. Catholics and Protestants were delineated politically.
During the second campaign, the Sunday Herald (an anti-confederate paper)
published a story describing the nuns leaving their convents for the referendum to cast
their first ever vote against confederation. Smallwood and associates sent a copy of the
paper, circling the article in blue, to every Orange Lodge officer in Newfoundland
without comment. They "were oITto the races".2<J The Confeder-dtes wrapped themselves
in the Union Jack, proclaiming a vote for Canada was a VOle for Britain and against "the
Roman plot."
Protestant church doors were painted with "Conledcration means British Union
with French Canada". The fact that no Catholic Chureh doors were painted meant only
one thing - Catholics had painted it on the Protestant church doors, reason enough for
Protestants to favour Confedcration. Religious strife was rampant. Evcn Governor
MacDonald, a Methodist, called upon thc Protestants to pull "together in defence of their
interest. ,,30 Smallwood was beaten and almost lynched during the campaign, causing him
to carry a .22 calibre revolver though it was not loaded.
Family member fought family member, neighbour turned against neighbour.
Protestants against Catholics. The final result gave the Confederates the victory by a
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mere 7000 votes. or 52 percent of Ihe total. Thuugh the antagonism soon died away aftcr
the campaign. the Catholic hierarchy was slower to forgive. Archbishop Roche refused
to meet with Primc Minister $1. Laurcnt and I"lealth Minister Paul Martin (both Roman
Catholics) later in the year. 31
In part to appease the Roman Catholics, Smallwood ensured that the educational
system would be protected in Confederation with Canada. Term 17 of the Terms of
Union of Newfoundland With Canada outlined the protection. The section ensured that
"... the (Newfoundland) Legislature will not have authority to make laws prejudicially
affecting any right or privilege with respect to denominational schools... that any class or
classes ofpcrsons nave by law in Newfoundland at the date ofUnion...."32 The section
also stipulated that all public funding to education had to be given out on a non-
discriminatory basis. [t has been suggested that the non-discriminatory provision was
addcd because of the decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Tiny
Separate School Tru.dees v. The KinlJ which allowed Ontario to reduce the Roman
Catholic separate sehool share of appropriations for education. This was notwithstanding
section 93 of The Constitution Act, 1867.34 The protected rights may summarized as
follows:
a right to denominationally-based school ooards which could own and operate
schools;
the right ofthese boards to appoint and dismiss teaehcrs;H
the right ofthcse schools to receive pub[ie funds on a non-diseriminatory basis;
and
the right to establish dcnominational colleges.
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Thus, the rights gained in 1874 and reiterated in the Education Act of 1927 were
entrenched in the new arrangement with Canada.
By 1964, a rapidly growing student population brought Newfoundland face to face
with serious deficiencies in the education system. Students were scoring lower on
standard examinations than their Canadian counterparts; few students were attending
university; there existed overlapping administrative costs; and there were a multitude of
isolated one and two-room schools.36 As a result, the Newfoundland Government
conunissioned Dr. Phil Warren to study the problem. The Commission's major
recommendation was "...that the Department of Education be reorganized on a functional
rather than a denominational basis.M37
In 1950, the Department ofEducation Act created the Council of Education to be an
advisory committe.:: however, it turned out to be more of an administmtive body. Th.:
denominational members of the Council's first loyalties were 10 thc concerns of their
respective church. Each pos:>cssed a veto power on educational policy. Thus, any
suggestions that were perceived as being against the principle of denominational
education were not put on the public agenda. The Warrcn Commission's report led to a
dismantling of this Council. Most Protestant churches were in favour of this idea but
both the Roman Catholic and Pentecostal churches opposed it vehementiy.38 The three
Roman Catholic members on the Commission wrote a minority rcport and opposed the
general recommendation of abolishing the Council of Education on the basis that it was
outsid.: Ihe tenns of reference of the Commission and that it violated Section 17 of the
TcrmsofUnion.J9
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In a brief to the Premier, the Pentewstal Church stated that the current system was
the "...ideal educational system for a Christian democracy such as Newtoundland.,,4o Thc
submission went on to explain that the Commission's use of the word "fllllctional" was to
infer that the current system was not funclional. Instead, the Commission should be
concerned with "structure" and keep the denominational aspect alive. The Pentecostals
were opposed to removing the church-state relationship within the Dcpartment.
However, despite the objections of the Roman Catholics and the Pentecostals, the
Council of Education was abolished by the 1968-69 legislation (The Education Act and
The Schools Act).
Evcntually, a compromise was reached so that the Roman Catholic and Pentecostal
churches withdrew their complaints. Reflecting Ihe compromise, Ihe legislation
established three separate Denominational Education Committees outside the Department
to provide an advisory function. Each Committee was responsible lor the religious
education programs and the distribution of any denominational grants to the school
boards within ilsjurisdiction.4J
In the 1960s, four Protestant denominations~2 joined Iheir systems into one. This
became known as the "Integrated" schools. Roman Catholic, PentecostaJ and Sevenlh-
day Adventist continued to operate their own independent systems.
11 is important to note thatlhe Pentecostal Assemblies of Newfoundland (referred to
as "the Pentecostal Church") did not have fonnal constitutional rights in 1949 but in 1987
that changed. Premier Brian Pcckford's government in 1987 sponsored a constitutional
amendmenl of Term 17 to specifically grant constitutional prolection to the Pentecoslal
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denominalional schools.~J The 1987 amendment was passed virtually unnoticed by the
public at large. The denominational school issue was simply not on the political radar
The resulting strucmre had a non-dcnominational Department of Education at the
top with a middle structure known as the Denominational Educational COlUlciis (DECs).
The DECs maintained a high level of involvement in governmental policy with
significant powers to oversee that government was following the Tenn 17 rights of the
churches. Below the DECs were local school boards. By 1990, there were 26 school
boards, overseen by three Denominational Educational Councils. The prominent role of
the DECs in education policy wa~, as discussed next, another indicator of the church role
asa "gatekeeper".
4.3 The Churches And The Public Agenda
It was obvious to many Newfoundland politicians, with an adroit understanding of
their history and a keen eye for their careers, that they were not to cross wills with the
churches on the issue of education. There was an acceptcd political adage that churches
were quite capable of mobilizing their members to support denominational education.
Any attempt to refonn the school system was quickly stopped. To some observers,
the churches had ~ears" on government deliberations, whether it was in the bureaucracy
that developed in the twentieth century in the fonn of Denominational Education
Councils (DECs) or amongst the internal workings of the government, well positioned to
affect the public agenda. Mark Graesser saw the churches as gatekeepers, using their
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power to mobilize their bias to maintain the status quO.44 The DECs were empowered to
sit with the Minister of Education and t\','o senior civil servants on the Denominational
Policy Conunission (OPe) to advise Cabinet on education policy affccting thc privileges
ofthe churches. Thus, the gatckeeper rolc.
One of the examples that Graesscr gave as evidence of the churches' gatekeeper
role was that of an incident involving Lynn Verge, the Minister of Education from 1979-
1985. When meetings occurred with the churches, said Verge, it was always to discuss
"their agenda." To cross the churches was not (0 be taken lightly. At one point she had
unconsciously neglected to balance an advisory conunittee to the Department of
Education with Roman Catholic members. TIle Church published a challenging article in
its newspaper, The Monitor, describing Verge as a "bigot and enforcer." The St John's
Daily New.I· picked up the story and echoed the semiments of The Monitor. Verge got no
support. She felt it was "3 warning not to try anything serioUS.,,4S
Even as public support shifted against maintaining the denominational school
system, as explored below, the Newfoundland Government did not bring refonn to the
forefront Brian Peckford, Premier from 1979-1989, while cognizant of public support
for changes to the denominational school system, did not engage in an aggressive reform
program because "historicaJ and cultural realities" could not be disregarded. 46
Not only Government perceived church influence over the people, but so did the
labour unions. In September 1986, the provincial employees went out on an illegal
strike. Tensions were high and the heads of four churches intervened with a plan to end
the strike. Government accepted it and so did the Newfoundland Association of Public
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Employees (NAPE). Fraser March, then presidcnt of NAPE. said the union had "no
choicc" but to comply ,,,ith the churches request saying, "The heads of the four churches
are extremely powcrful in this provincc and neither the Government nor the union could
tum their backs on the churches .. If we turncd them down we would be destroyed in
thisprovince.,,47
Chris Decker, Minister of Education under Clyde Wells, had this to say,
The Deputy Minister in the Department of Education that was clearly looked upon
one time as being one term heing (sic) a Catholic appointee. His religion was
always taken into consideration - Protestant once then a Catholic - they definitely
played a role and up until the Warren Commission they were right in the
Department of Education - the Superintendents for Goodness sakes. I mean Ihey
were the gatekeepers 100%. The funding was given to them. Even when I was
minister first to build schools we gave cach church an allocation. Tbey decided
where to build the schools. they decided what schools to open what schools to
close, they decided who would teach. You couldn't get a teacher's lieense unless it
was signed by one of the denominations so they were gatekeepers 100 percent.48
When asked whether they acted as gate-keepers while he was Minister of Education he
replied,
Oh absolutely. They were, I didn't make them gatekeepers. I tried my best to
change it and we did eventually but we didn't put the final nail on the coffin until
Tobin came on tlle scenc. That is anothcr story.
Though the churches appeared to use their positioning within the education system
to maintain thc status quo, thcre was an increasing chorus of people demanding reform.
It was a challenge that the Newfoundland Government was soon to address. What
follows is a brief synopsis of the general arguments that were used to seek reform.
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4.4 Ilemands For Reform
By the mid I980s, a number of opinion leaders and educational professionals began
(0 foment for education reform. Among the criticisms were; the education system was
inefficient; it violated human rights; the students were at a disadvantage.
The Newfoundland & Labrador Teachers' Association (NLTA) played a significant
role in organizing the cry for reform. In May 1986, the NLTA calk-d upon the
government of Premier Brian Peckford to establish a Royal Commission to examine the
denominational system, citing a serious flaw in the system of "isolation by
denomination." The NLTA was willing to allow a "church-influenced education" but
demanded that reform of the system for "the best possible education" was necessary. The
government assured the NLTA that such a study would be carried out but government
soon changed hands and the NLTA had to get the ear of Premier Clyde Wells.49
William A. McKim, a psychology professor at Memorial University, became an
outspoken crilic oCthe system as a result ofa personal experience. He and his wife
decided that it would be easier for his family if their children attended school near where
they worked rather than where thcy livoo. Thcy approachoo the school in St. John's
about transferring their child there. McKim's spouse was told she ought "to Slay home
with the kids."sO The McKims' reaction was "what right docs he have to force his view
on us". Totally convinced that the system was "evil", McKim began writing
commentaries for CBe radio on the s\lbject. Subsequently, he was approached to write a
book on the subject. He declined, as it was not a field of any gl'C3t personal interest. He
had had a personal ron in with the system, but the issue was not of any academic interest
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to him. Finally, he agreed to edit the volume 1711: Vexed Questiun that was pUblished in
1988.S1
TImt book brought together the essence of the debate, in an articulate and
comprehensive manner, for the general public. It also became somewhat ofa manifesto
for the cause. The Preface claims to be neither "pro- nor anti-denominational education".
However, it is evident that most contributors opposed the denominational system
McKim argued, "Education is too important to be left to educators. Ultimately, it will be
the public that will influence the course of education and it is that public that we intend to
be the audience for this book. "n
For the CBC Radio program "Commentary", heard across the country one day
following the September 1995 Referendum, William McKim proclaimed that in order for
churches to run the public schools society must accept religious discrimination and loss
of accountability which are "not a suitable price to pay for religious ambience and moral
leadership." "It seems an ultimate irony thaI in order to set a moral example to children.
schools nee<! to be excused from the constraint of basic human rights." Churches running
schools will choose their own dignity rather than the well being of children, McKim
suggested, as evidenced by the Roman Catholic Church's cover up of boys abused at the
Mount Ca,>hel Orphanage.S3 This stinging commentary summed up for many the popular
view of the denominational school system.
The public musings about the school system by these opinion leaders appeared to
reflect the growing public sentiment. The next seclion presents the results of the public
opinion surveys that were conducted during the late 1970s through to the 1990s.
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4.5 Public Opinion
For over twenty years, political scientist Mark Graessar tracked public opinion on
the denominational school system. From his early surveys in the 1970s to the 1990s in
the midst of the reform debate, the results were consistently showed that public opinion
was ahead of the political leaders in desiring change to the system.
Graessar discovered that among the changes the public wanted included: a single
school bus system in each area, single joint school boards in each arca, children to attcnd
the same schools - they disagreed with the idea that children should attend separate
schools by religion, religion taught by teachers of other denominations. no
denominational restrictions on hiring tcachers, and allowing board members of non-
recognized denominations to serve.54
There were a number of items that the public wanted to keep in the schools, such as
the teaching of religion, the preservation of church rights, church involvement in school
boards and teachers who exemplified "religious values and standards. ,,5S
It was Graesser's conclusion that "a large majority of the Newfoundland public
favours a unified non-sectarian system, but not one that is wholly secular. ,,5{0 Thus,
"much oftlle expressed support for the "denominational system" as a whole is "in name
only," a generalized, perhaps sentimental attachment to the distinctive Newfoundland
education system with which most people grew up."n
It is interesting to note that over time the public became even more desirous ofa
single non-denominational system. In 1979,48 percent ofthose surveyed wanted a
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single public school system: ;1 increased to 51 pereen! in 1986,58 and by \99\, some 67
percent of those surveyed wanlcd a single non-denominational school systcm.59
It would appear that those who favoured reform of the school system were those
who did not attend church regularly and tended to be among the higher educated as the
following tables show.
Table 4-1
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72
47
51 percent
53
43
28
49 percent
SYSTEM PREFERRED BY CHURCH AlTENDANCE60
Support
Support Denominational School Non-Denominational
Table 4-2
SYSTEM PREFERRED BY EDUCATION61
Support
Education Level Support Denominational School
School
To Grade 8 47 ereent
Some High 50
School
Non- Denominational
53 percent
50
High School 43
Grad
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Vocationalffech. 29 71
Some Univcrsit 24 76
As Newfoundlanders became more educated and practiced less religion, the
denominational school system was incongruent with their lifestyle. It may have been fine
for a previous era, but not for the late nineteenth Century. It is slriking, therefore, that the
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issue was nOI dealt with sooner. It begs the queslion why? If the populace was becoming
more educated, anending church less, and wanting change to the schools, why did not the
political leadership take hold of this public desire and be an instrument for change
sooner? Instead adopting policies in accordance with public opinion, the provincial
government expanded Term 17 rights. In 1987 the Pentecostal Church's right to
educational funding was entrenched in a constitutional amendment. This was done
without any public discussion or opposition. The issue of denominational education was
not on the public agenda. Many observers were convinced that once the issue did arrive
on thc public agenda, thc Newfoundland people would seck change.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, an attempt was made to show that Newfoundland society depended
upon the Christian churches to develop an education system. The system became
parochial at public expense. Ovcr the last century and a half, each time the government
attempted to take control from the churches, the churches successfully resisted the
overtures. The governments were powerless in the face of church opposition. This
resulted in accepted opinion that the churches were not to be challenged in the area of
education. The "cultural realities" did not pennit government to wrestle control from the
churches. The churches acted as gatekeepers. They were able to prevent the education
issue from getting on the public agenda
During the 1970s to the 19905, Newfoundland society became more secular in
outlook. Church attendance declim:d, people became more educated, resulting in greater
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preferences for change in the education system. The denominational character of the
school system was becoming incongruent with the lifestyles of most citizens. While
there was a certain amount of nostalgia for schools teaching religion, there was limited
support for separating students based on religion.
By the late 1980s, the stage was set for some leader to put together a cogent strategy
and argument for reform ~ that leader turned out to be Clyde Wells.
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ChapterS
EDUCATIONAL REFORM 1989-1998
5.1 Introduction
This chapter outlines the major events of the reform process during the 1989-1998
time period.
5.2 The Election of Clyde Wells and the Williams Commission
During the 1989 election, a number of prominent educator.; ran as candidates with
the Liberal Party undcr the leadership of Clyde Wells for the explicit purpose of
reforming the education system. I "It was one of the main reasons I went in - to do
something about denominational education," says Chris Decker, who would become a
Minister of Education. Later, he reiterated "1 wanted the churches out, period."2 Those
involved in the machinery of denominational education were uneasy from the very start
of the Wells administration in government. As early as June 1969, while a member of the
Smallwood government, Wells let his views be known on the denominational system.]
He had voted against the Smallwood Government's Education Act, saying that the
province could not afford the denominational system. The church leaders saw the
election of Clyde Wells as premier in 1989 as the "catalyst", the beginning of the end.
"He was the person who 1 think," says Gerry Fallon, "had decided that ifhe ever had the
chance that he would do something about the denominational system in the province.'''!
Dr. Phil Warren, the former chair orthe I960s Warren Commission on the
education system, was among the successful Liberal candidates. Soon after the election,
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Warren was appointed Minister of Education and while in that role he promoted
discussion in the cabinet of what could be done to reform the system. "After considering
the options," says Warren. "including unilateral action and making some changes, when
it came to the denominational issue we felt that a public review was the best way to
examine al1 ofthe issues, including the denomination issue:'s
In 1990, Dr. Leonard Williams, a former President of the NLTA, professor of
education at Memorial University, and teacher, was appointed to chair a commission to
review the educational system of the province. The other commissioners included; Trudy
Pound-Curtis, Comptroller of Memorial University, and Regina Warren, Assistant
Superinlendent oflbe Roman Catholic School Board for Humber-51. Barbe.
Included in Ibe broad terms of reference was the mandate to "Examine the extent of
duplication rt:sulting from the denominational system and the costs associated with such
duplication." This was the first time that the denominational issue was ever included in
Ihe terms of reference of any commission or taskforce dealing with education and, as it
turned out, it was the most controversial. The tenns of reference for the Warren
Commission in Ibe I960s specifically "discouraged any examination of the
denominational sYSlem.'~ However, in this case, it was specifically included Phil Warren
explained why:
You had a whole selection of factors such as, the needs of education, the attitudes of
the people, and the lack of credibility oflbe churches, made possible I think a new
look, a more open discussion of the denominational system. I mean the system
hadn't changed since Ibe 1870s through to the 1990s. So I felt thai the time had
come in the early I990s because of SOffie of the demographic, and philosophical,
and the educational reasons that thc time had come to take a fresh look at the
system. The commission was a mechanism for letting the public to have a say on it
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and politicians have a desire 10 get elected you know, and you do not want 10 do
something that is stupid but still you want 10 lead. So we felt that one of the ways
to lead was to o~n up this debate and see what the public would say and see what
the commission would recommend.7
The churches were opposed to letting the denominational system get on the public
agenda. They were willing to discuss reform only to the extent of making the system
more efficient, but not a debate on the enshrined rights of Term 17. Representations were
made to government by the churches to have the denominational issue removed from the
tenns of reference - they were rebuffed.s "Even the calling of the Royal Commission. 10
me," said Pastor Earl Balstone of the Pentecostal Chureh. "was to confinn government's
agenda rather than to discover what the agenda was.,,9
While those with an interest in maintaining the status quo questioned the
government agenda in appointing a Royal Commission, the Commission's Chair saw the
agenda driven, "largely because of very profound economic, social, political changes that
were taking place."10 For Williams, there were three reasons to have such a study. First,
the greatest impetus for refonn came from the demographic shift in Newfoundland's
studenl population. Going from a student population of 168,000 in the 1960s to 90,000 in
the 1990s was "a precipitous fall." as Dr. Williams explained. Something had to be done
to address the problem of declining enrolment.
Second, were the demands to modernize the system of education. Higher standards
were required for sludents who by and large sought post-secondary education. There was
a demand for more technology in Ihe classroom and quality access. This created a
dcmand for more resources.
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Third, says Williams, was the fiscal reality. "In a province like Newfoundland
funds are scarce ... We had to do things a lot more economically and with a lot more
efficiency and with a lot more cooperation,"
The Commission held 36 public hearings within a year. It received 1,041 written
and oral submissions, and 128 petitions containing thousands of additional names. Some
eighty-six percent of the submissions dealt with the denominational school system - the
majority of those sUPPOrled retention of the denominational schools. The Commission
sought a broad input, and where it felt it necessary hired expcrls to present a reporl. In
the fall of 1991, il ordered a survey to determine public supporl for the denominational
system,ll ThaI poll found that some 60 percent of all respondents were in favour of
switching to a "non-denominational system",12 The Commission concluded that a single
school system would save Ihe govemmenl $21.4 million.
"Now in our thinking," said Williams,
"when we looked at what was happening, a logical step to thaI in view of what I had
just said aboul demographics and educational needs and scarce resources, the next
logical step would have been for all of the churches to come togelher under a, I
don't like to use the word "integrated" umbrella, but in a cooperative, collaborative
way. without changing anything and retain thcn within the kind of values and
religious education opportunities they wanted to retain,"
A single non-denominational school system "based on ludeo-Christian principles"
formed the basis of the proposed model presented by the Williams Commission in its
report Ollr Children, Our FIITl/re, released on March 31, 1992. The model incorporated
the following key characteristics:
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Children would attend the nearest school. Where numbers warranted children
would be given the opportunity for religious activities and instruction in their own
faith. The system would be sensitive to the concerns of children of all religious
groups.
The 27 denominationally based boards would be replaced with 9 non-
denominational electe<! school boards funded on the basis of need.
The churches' role would no longer include the administration of schools; rather,
their primary role would be the provision of religious education programs and
pastoral care to students. The Denominational Education Councils would be
disbanded. No longer would churches have a say as to the distribution of school
funding or the hiring and firing of teachers.
Recognizing that its recommendations contravened the Term 17 rights of the
churches, the Commission said, "it cannot accept thai the wording or spirit of these rights
and privileges established dec.1des ago were intended to paralyse the system in
perpetuity, and stifle the ability of the system to respond effectively to change.,,13
Out of the Commission's 211 recommendations, only about 12 dealt with areas
affecting denominational rights. The churches would later argue that they supported
reform - some 95 percent of recommendations, but they could not accept the dismantling
of the denominational system as protected under Term 17. The churches' view is best
summed up by Gerry Fallon, who at the time was the Executive Dire<:tor of the Catholic
Educational Council, "The Royal Commission report in 1992 gave legitimacy to what
Clyde Wells wanted to dO.,,14
"I do not think there was any plot to get rid of the system," Phil Warren continues,
I think there was a view that the system was one of the major problems
associated ith providing a quality education and it needed to be reformed... the
Commission was totally free... once the terms of ref..:rence were drafted and the
members were appointed the government gave the Commission full freedom and
they did their job. They came out with their recommendations which perhaps went
beyond what some members of the government felt that they would. They were
probably more profound recommendations d1.1n a number of us Ihought would
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emerge. But we, a lot of us, did hope that there would be some recommendations
dealing with this issue. IS
5.3 Negotiations Between Churches and Government
Government recognized that it could not unilaterally impose the recommendations
of the Williams Commission without constitutional amendment. Talks between the
govenuncnt and the churches were undertaken to see whether goodwill existed on both
sides to reach a voluntary agreement of implementing the recommendations.
In July 1992, Chris Decker replaced Phil Warren as Minister of Education. As a
former United Church Minister, Decker had experience serving as chair of church school
boards. He was convinced that churches had no place in running a school. He
considered himself a radical in the Well's Government. While most ofthe cabinet were
advocating compromise, he favoured a total severing of church involvement in the school
system. 16 In November 1992, Decker announced the govemmenl's inlenlion to carry out
all of the recommendations of the Williams Commission report.
On March 12, 1993, Premier Wells announced to the House of Assembly that he
would work \vith the churches toward a consensus on education rdonn. In order to reach
conscnsus, two committees were established. First, the "Committee on Principles" made
up of Ihe heads of churches and the members of the Planning and Priorities Committee of
Cabinet. The second, known as the "Committee of Officials," was composed of
"officials representing the church interest in education. and officials on the government
side of education.,,17 The second commiuee consisted of the executive directors of the
Denominational Education Councils, (Gerry Fallon, Earl Batstone, Dr. Tom Pope, and
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Huben Norman), a Seventh-day Adventist representative (George Morgan), and the
Deputy and Assistant Deputy Ministers of Education - Dr. Leonard Williams, and Dr.
Robert Crocker. This second committee was to do the primary and detailed work in a
plan to arrive at a consensus.
After the announcement by the Premier. an election was called and the Wells
government was rc.clected. During the election campaign, education reform was not a
major issue; perhaps it was muted by the fact that the church leaders and government had
arrived at an agreement to seek a consensus. After the election, in the spring of 1993 to
mid.July 1993, the Committee of Officials met on a monthly basis - however. it appeared
to some church officials that the government was "treading water:' There was not much
happening.
In late June 1993. the Deputy Minister and Assistant Deputy Minister, both Roman
Catholics and apparent sympathizers with the denominational system, left the Department
of Education. In their place came Len Williams (Chair of the Williams Commission) as
the new Deputy Minister, and Bob Crocker, as the Assistant Deputy Minister assigned
the portfolio ofimplcmenting the recommendations of the Williams Commission. Both
were strong advocates of reform. Very little has been said about thaI decision; however,
there can be no doubt that government ensured that the bureaucracy in the Department of
Education was composed of individuals who would enthusiastically carry out the desires
of their polilicaI task masters. "Let's just say this," said Chris Decker, "early in my
mandate we changed the Deputy and some assistant deputies. I don't know if it is
71
coincid~nce bUI il seems like things happened faster - maybe J was getting more used 10
the Depanment or whatever, you know."
George Morgan, the Seventh.day Adventist representative, noted, " ..there was no
question that from the day Bob Crocker began to meet with us. the Depanment of
Education was different Ihan when he took office. There were a couple of assistants that
he started to work on the minutiae of working the system. There was no question as to
what was going to go ahead. We could make all the suggestions we like but he would
always say, "That will be taken into consideration," but you can promise to oonsider
anything for somebody's execution in the moming:,18
During the months leading up to the November 22, 1993 Committee of Principles
meeting, the Committee of Officials met regularly. Rather Ihan working on a joint
proposal, the churches worked on one framework, while the Department of Education,
led by Dr. Crocker, worked on another. On November 22, 1993, the churches presented
Premier Wells with the "Coterminous model" - which called for a reduction in school
boards (District Boards) from 27 to 10 for the province, working in tandem with parallel
bodies known as the Education Authorities (religious authorities). A Superintendent
would head each District Board and a Director would head each parallel Education
Authority representing the religious class (or churches) holding the constitutional rights.
Goography, and the number of religious adherents, would determine the number of
Education Authorities with each board The Education Authority would havejurisdiction
over the constitutional rights; thus funding teachcr hiring and firing, school buildings, and
school organization would fall undcr thcir control. Under this model, the school board
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would be elected totally along denominational lines. The churches designed the model to
preserve their constitutional rights while improving school efficiency and effectiveness.
Three days later, on November 25, 1993, the government responded to the church
proposal with a document entitled: Adjus/jng the Cuurse./ 9 This proposal was modelled
on the recommendations of the Williams Commission. It called for tcn inter-
denominational boards with ten elected members at large and only one representative
from each denomination (where numbers warranted). It eliminated the Denominational
Education Councils and fonned Denominational Committees that had jurisdiction over
only religious education and pastoral care.
Government also proposed changes to the School Construction Board which would
have seven members, three from churches and three from government, with an agrccd-
upon chair. The Board would establish province-wide priorities for school construction,
repair, etc. without regard to denominational affiliation. All new schools built would be
inter-denominational. Where uni-denominational schools existed, the government would
be the sole determiner of viability guidelines.
The Government position was e1car -things had to change. The privileges that the
churches had enjoyed in the past would be curtailed. Churchcs would be left with the
basic role in religious instruction and an advisory role in provincial curriculum poliey-
no longer were they to be involved in the administration of the schools.
Government's willingness to compromise wa$ seen in the allowance for uni-
denominational schools when the stringent criteria were met. In such instances, the
school would control religious education, pastoral care, and school philosophy and
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ambiance. However, where there were inter-denominational schools, such maners would
be the domain of the school board, with an advisory committee with denominational
representation to advise the board accordingly.
5.4 Referendum of 1995
Over two years of negotiations with chureh leaders convinced government that an
agreement was not imminent. Wells decided that he would introduce legislation to make
the necessary changes to create a unified school system with churehes only having the
right to provide religious instruction. In response to his announcement, he received a
Notice of Intent from the Roman Catholic and Pentecostal Churches to litigate.
Recognizing that the government would lose a legal challenge, Wells felt he had no
choice but seek a constitutional amendment of Term 17, and to do that, he wanted public
support. On June 23,1995, a referendum was called for September 5,1995.20
It certainly was not lost on anyone that the announcement came on the last day of
school for the year, "wh.ich of course makes it extremely difficult," said Janet Henley-
Andrews, "to organize on a school basis because your school buildings aren't open, your
parents have disbursed for the summer - all of that kind ofthiog."21 Wells look the
approach that the government should nol campaign for the Yes side but rather settled
with providing general information on the constitutional amendment that government was
proposing.
Both the question and the proposed amendment were opaque. Wells and Ed
Roberts, along with two or three other lawyers, had drafted a new Term 17 that attempted
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to walk both sides of the street. It provided for a gener-d1 school system that would be
"inter-denominational," but allowed for "uni-denominational" schools "subject to
provincial legislation". "Clyde and myself." says Ed Roberts, "went as far as we thought
we could, not as far as we wanted to go. If I had my way, I won't speak for anyone else,
if I had my way we would have put to the people in the '95 referendum the question that
was put in the '97 referendum. We didn't, we never considered doing so because we
didn't think we could get that far. It was a fair choice.,,22
The referendum debate was filled with talk on the govemment saving millions of
dollars from the elimination of duplication such as school busing; others were afraid of
losing the religious ambience; and still others complained that the proposal did not go far
enough
The question asked statt.>d:
Do you support revising Tenn 17 in the manner proposed by the govemment, to
enable refonn of the denominational education system? Yes No
The question was criticized for inferring that reform could not happen, but for the
amendment of Term 17. Since only a handful of the 211 recommendations of the
Williams Commission dealt with the denominational system, the churches maintained
that the majority of them dealing with efficiency and effectiveness could be accomplished
without an amendment.
The general public had to be excused for finding the whole matter confusing. rhere
were many voices with different meanings ufthe word "reform". "We can say," said the
Editors of The Expre~·s. "we are in favor of educational reform. Of course, that's not
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really saying anything. Everyone claims to be in favor of reform. The real question is
how do you go about i1.,,23 Churches and their supporters saw government's use of the
word "reform" as a removal of the Term 17 rights -they campaigned against the
proposal. "If government wants to move in the direction of a public sector education
system," said Hubert Norman of the Integrated Education Council, "then that question
should be clearly put to the people."24
Others against the proposal were those who felt the proposed Term 17 gave the
churches too much ofa role in education. "And this absolute lack of clarity made me
uneasy," \vrote MaJjorie Doyle. "If so many people had trouble grappling with this
business, how clear was the question? The issue? The consequencesT2S Both Lynn
Verge, Leader of the Opposition, and Jack Harris, the lea<lerofthe New Democratic
Party, argued that the proposal did not go far enough and announced they would vote
"No."
Still others advocated a vote in favor orthe proposal because it atlcast moved in a
favourable direction. Peter Fenwick called upon someone to, ,.... teach Verge and Harris
the old adage that haifa loaf is better than no loaf at aJl.'>16 To vote "No" would '· ... mean
that the government would lose almost all its bargaining power to bring about change in
the education system. The churches could thumb their noses at the government. Any
future changc would be almost completely at the churches' discretion.,,27
Not only were (he citizens mesmerized by the confusion during (he campaign and
the wording of the govenuncnt proposal, so was the Minister of Education! Chris Decker
stated,
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The first referendum was not clear, I mean tbe wording in it was extremely diffieull
10 understand to the point that I remember saying once "I wouldn't know how to
vote myself-I am assuming I'd a vote yes." The wording was not clear?~
The Pemecostal and Roman Catholic Churches hire<! Leo Power and nine others to
organize a political campaign for the "No" side.29 Power was no stranger to political
campaigning - having worked as John Crosbie's executive assistant in Ottawa besides
other provincial campaigns. Their strategy was to keep track of the supporters, and
concentrate effort in areas where the "No" side was weak. There was an organized media
blitz that included newspaper, radio, and television ads. Combined with this effort was a
letter sent by the ehurch lcaders to their congregants seeking their support against the
government's proposal. "As far as we were concerned, we ran a good campaign. We got
our vote out, we ran a very strong, a very organized campaign," says Janet Henley-
Andrews.
The "No" side argued that the government's proposal would remove religious
exercises from the classroom - including those associated with Christmas and Easter.
Government denied that such would be the case as alI schools would be labeled
"denominational" under the new Tcnn 17. Such announcemenls by the government did
little to allay the fears oflhe "No" side. The "No" side also argued that the new Term 17
was being forced on the minority denominations against their will. It was a removal of
minority rights from the constitution - a first in the history ofeanada.
For the "Yes" side. there was no organized campaign. Wells took the position that,
in the spirit of fairness, the government should not advocate onc side over the other. He
was of the view that "if public funds was to be spent conducting a fair plebiscite to
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ascertain the wishes of the public, it "would have been a subversion of the referendum
process" to spend additional funds trying to influence the choice.")O This resulted in the
"Yes" campaign consisting of an independent effort of newspaper columnists, letters 10
the editor, and calls to the open line shows. The government's removal from the
referendum debate meant that there was no central organizing foree for the "Yes" side-
no central strategic approach 10 the campaign. The government sent a pamphlet to every
household with the old and new versions ofTenn 17 and explanatory notes. It also
advertised in the newspapers to correct "factual errors" of the "No" side as the campaign
progressed. This lack of organization of the "Yes" side almost cost the government the
referendum.
The "Yes" side focused on two specific areas: the saving of$20-30 million
eliminating duplication; and that the poor results by Newfoundland students on Canadian
standard tl:sts could only be addressed with a more efficient system.31 It is significant to
note, as Graesser points out. the "Yes" side did not lL~e arguments centering on values of
non-discrimination, equality and plumlism. There was, for example, little emphasis on
Ihe idea that it was wrong to segregate children from their friends on religious grounds or
to dismiss teachers 011 the basis of rcligion or personal lifestyle issues. 12
On September 5, 1995, despite the organized effon orthe ''No'' side, 55 percent of
those who voted went with the government. "We were delighted with the result,"
Henley-Andrews maintains - "We would have loved to have won it bUI when you looked
at our percentage of the population in relation to the percentage of the combination of the
Integrated faiths the achievement of the 45 percent "No" vote was quite something to be
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honest - that's certainly how many of us viewed it." The modest majority for the
government was significant when you consider that polling for both the "No" side and
government revealed that government had the support of some 70 percent at the
beginning orthe campaign.33 Part orthe "No" side success may be attributed to the low
turnout of the eligible vote - 52 percent
To some political pundits, the close vote meant that Wells would have a difficult
time convincing Ottawa to agree to a constitutional amendment. "Neither side came out
a winner," said Steve Neary; "lfl was Mr. Wells what I would do is hold this over the
heads of the churches and get hack to the bargaining table because I don't think that
(Prime Minister Jean) Chretien would be very receptive to amending the constitution
affecting minority groups that would have repercussions throughout all ofCanada.,,34
Others saw it quite differently. Peter Boswell, of Memorial University, noted that the
"No" side ran an organized campaign getting the vote out and that the, "low turnout
would in fact makc thc govcrnment's case stronger. This means of the othcr 48 per cent
of people who didn't vote, we can assume they were either the silent 'yes we want
change' or did not feel strongly cnough against it to vote."n
5.5 Post·Refercndum Developments
5.5.1 Term 17 Stalled and Wells Resigns
The Newfoundland House of Assembly passed a resolution on October 31, 1995,
calling on Ottawa to pass the ncw Term. The resolution met with challenges both within
and outsidc government caucus. In the end, it passed 31-20.
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The amendment was soon to be stlllled in Ottawa - due in part to the intensive
lobbying campaign by the Roman Catholic and Pcntecostal churches with the politicians
in Ottawa. "We did a lot of Jobbying of federal politicians," says Henley-Andrews, "and
there was a significant block of Libenl1 MPs, and particularly backbenchers primarily
from Ontario, who were tot.111y opposed to the constitutional change and they were
making it very difficult within the Liberal caucus. They felt it had repercussions in
Ontario, which also had constitutionally protected Roman Catholic schools, and that it
would be a dangerous precedent."
Although Wells had obtained personal assurance from Prime Minister Chretien of
the passage of the Tenn 17 amendment in the House of Commons, the federal
government stalled as it considered the arguments of the Bloc Quebecois. The Bloc
Quebecois, the Official Opposition, saw thc acceptance of a constitutional amendment
with 55 percent ofa referendum as a precedent for a future referendum in Quebec.
Just around Christmas 1995, Clyde Wells announced his retirement from politics
and within several weeks Brian Tobin was acclaimed as the new Premier.
Many ofthc "No" side thought that Brian Tobin, a Roman Catholic, would
sympathize with their side and not force a constitutional amendmenl. Some Catholic
leaders claimed they had agreed with Tobin not to make education an issue during the
upcoming election in exchange for the promise o["an opportunity to sit down and discuss
Ihe whole issue in an effort 10 reach an agreemenl."J6 As leader oflbe Liberal Party,
Tobin dissolved the House and a new election was called in February 1996. In his
election platform, Tobin's campaign Slated:
80
Last year, a referendum w~ held on the important quc:slion of denominational
schools. The people have spoken. Education reform will proceed. What we
now face is the complex task to implement refonn in a manner which is effective
and fair. It is more important that we do things the right way than that we do them
in a quick way.37
The platform went on to say that the draft legislation was only one possible model
lor refonn and thai there would be further consultalion. Tobin was elected in a landslide
and shortly thereafter the churches and the government entered into another round of
negotiations 10 settle the differences. Governmenl was frustrated with the lack of
movement in Ottawa to pass the constitulional amendment and sought to meet with the
churches to hammer out an acceptable arrangement..l8 For Ihe Roman Catholic and
Pentecoslalleadcrs the meetings were seen as an attempt to obtain an agreement without
a constitutional amendment.J9
5.5.2 The Framework Agreement
In April 1996, it appeared that both sides finally came to a solution. The church
leaders and the government came up with an agreement - referred to as the "Framework
Agreement." Government and churches agreed to keep the schools uni-denominational
until they were changed over time to inter-denominational schools by the new school
boards. [t was unclear as to how and when such changes would occur, due to issues of
appointment andlor election of new school board members. One thing was clear: the
denominations would he ahle to appoint 70 percent of the members in the 10 new boards
throughout the province. The school boards would have denominational committees with
the authority to hire and fire teachers in uni·dcnominational schools. The Agreement was
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meant as an interim or a transitional mea<;ure toward implementation ofa general inter-
denominational system where uni-denominational schools were the exception. However,
that is not how it was perceived.
When the Framework Agreement became known, there was an outcry. The
editorial in The Evening Telegmm stated, "No mailer how Education Minister Roger
Grimes tries to sell his behind the scenes deal, the provincial government caved in whcre
it counts on education refonn. And the result is likely to mean delays in meaningful
reform of the cducation systcm for years to come.,040
The Integrated school boards wcre dead set against the agreement and organized a
meeting with all ofthc Integrated church leaders to express their disapproval of the
Framework Agreement. Only the Anglicans showed up. Steve Andrews, chainnan of the
Avalon Consolidated School Board. stated thai the problem was that "We're starting ofT
as uni-denominational and there's no commitment to go beyond that," but "If the power
of the denominational committees could be toned down or bllcked off, we might have
some basis for agreement." wilh the provincial government.41
At the general meeting of the Newfoundland and Labrador Home and School
Federation meeting on April 27, 1996, Roger Grimes was called upon to answer spirited
questions from parents on the Agreement. It appeared that a number of parents were
surprised to see that the education refonn did not remove the churches from the school
system. "If there's II problem," said Grimes, "maybe it's thaI people didn't know what
the government was offering before.'.42 That was indeed the problem, according 10 Kathy
LeGrow oflhe Home and School Federation, "From the school board's poine of view,
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people didn't understand what this was about becausc it wa'i discussed in an enviroruncnt
of distrust and secrecy.''''J
The Framework Agreement closely mirrored the Adjusling the Course model
proposed by the Wells' administration but it was obvious that many members of the
public had not rcalized to what extent the new Tcnn 17 sought to maintain
denominational rights in education, especially in uni-dcnominational schools. The reality
had bcgWl to sink in that churches would have a say in education. Lome Wheeler, a
former deputy education minister under the Progressive Conservative administration of
Brian Peckford, put it this way, ''The pereeption has been that revision of Term 17 of the
Newfoundland Act will somehow end church control or significantly limit church control
of the education system in Newfoundland. That's WTong.''''4
Government was faced with a growing anger in the public, The "Yes Means Yes"
Committee was organized by a number of parents and education professionals to lobby
the government to reject the Framework Agreement and "get on" with reform, This
group organized a petition campaign throughout the 51. John's area against the
agreement
For many, Tobin's government was waffling and had to move forward, 'Let's not
pussyfoot around," Bill Lee of the Avalon Consolidated School Board demanded of
Roger Grimes, the then Minister of Education; "Put in place what the people of this
province voted for in September and that was an inter-denominational system.''''s "rr
government concludes this is the best deal;' said Lee, "we as a board cannot condone it
and would prefcr to rcvert to the previous system." Lee was of the view that if approved
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the Fmmework Agreement would have taken Newfoundland back to 1968 before
integration first occurred in the province's school system. 46 Lee organized a number of
well-attended meetings in school gyms at Bishops College, Prince of Wales Collegiate,
and explained to his audiences why the Framework Agreement was inadequate. "This
had an important galvanizing effect," says Steve Wolinetz, "which explains the later
climate of public opinion.,047
Thougb the government had formally requested OUawa for a constitutional
amendment, the church leaders had hoped that the Framework Agreement would
eliminate sueh an amendment. Thus, there would be refonn without a constitutional
amendment.4~ From hindsight, such a view may have been somewhat naiVe. The public
outcry against the Framework Agreement caused government to back away from funhcr
deal making wilh the churches and a funher push on Ottawa was made for the
amendment. Tobin began 10 refer to the Framework Agreement as "a framework for
discussion," rather than a fonnal agreement.49 Gerry Fallon notes with some regret,
"The Integrated denominations and the Anglican Church in particular did not support the
Framework Agreement. If they had supported the Framework Agreement, then we would
never have had a constitutional amendment:'so The Integrated church leaders did not
want 10 be in a position where they renounced their education rights but Roman Catholics
and Pentecostals did not. 51
To press the matter with Ouawa, Brian Tobin orchestrated a unanimous resolution
from the Housc of Assembly for the amendment to be passed. On June 3, 1996, the
House of Commons voted in favour of the Newfoundland request for the constitutional
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amendment. However, for the next six months the Senate, exercising its prerogative, sent
the maller to its Standing Committee on Constitutional Affairs and hearings were held in
Ottawa and in 51. John's. The same arguments made during the events leading up to the
1995 Referendum and Williams Commission were IIOW being repeated before the Senate
comminee. The amendment was stalled for six months in the Senate, where the "No"
side made significant headway with the Senators, convincing them to amend the
constitutional proposal. The Senate's objections were overcome by a second !'!OlL<ie of
Commons vote on December 5, 1996.
Meanwhile, the school boards were in the process of merging - schools were being
rationalized and government was cutting back tcaching positions over the protest of
parents who threatened to keep their children out of school over the loss of teaching
positions.S2 The acrid atmosphere among the different school board trustees that were
now sitting together on new boards made for a very untenable situation. The battles were
also 10 flare up over the school designation process, that led to another referendum.
5.6 Refc.-cndum of 1997
Though the new Term 17 transferred more authority over schools from the churches
to the government, it continued to allow uni-denominational schools at public expense.
However the new Act created a "negative optioning" plan whereby all schools were
deemed to he ioterdeoominational schools unless the school board wa.~ satisfied that there
was sufficient demand and viability for a uni-denominational school.
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In February 1997, school boards conducted a registration process to establish the
demand by parenl~ for interdenominational or uni-denominational schools, Those
parents who desired to have uni-denominational schools were required to send in a ballot
to the school boards with their vote of whether they wanted to send their children to
either an interdenominational school or a uni-denominational school. The ballot allowed
for the choice of "interdenominational'" or "OIher," but did not Jist any denominational
schools. A parent who did not send in their ballot was deemed by the government to
hllve voted interdenominational. "Clearly the objective WllS to make it as difficult as
possible," says Henley.Andrews.
Henley-Andrews described the effort that now ensued as the "No" side campaigned
again to ensure that all of the parents of the Roman Catholic children sent in their ballots
indicating their desire for Roman Catholic schools. "We had phone tearns in most of the
schools within the SI. John's Roman Catholic School Board at the time," she said, "and
phom:d t::vt::ry single parent you know, "Have you received your form in the mail? Have
you sent it in?" To make sure there were as few default votes as possible."
Their campaign worked. Over 80 percent of the parents with children in the St.
Pius X s.-hool voted for a Roman Catholic school; in the Mary Queen of the Peace school
roughly 85 percent oflhe parents choSt:: a Roman Catholic school; and 80·85 percent of
the children's parents of the Gonzaga school chose a Roman Catholic school.53 Hcnley-
Andrews notes that the new transition school boards faced a problem that they had not
anticipated - there was going to be a large number of Roman Catholic schools remaining
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in the district in order to accommodate all of the children whose parents had chosen
Roman Catholic schools.
The Depanment of Education advised the school boards on Man::h 10, 1997 of the
teacher allocation for the 1997-98 school year. The school boards designated schools and
assigned teachers between March and JUDe. The resullS oflhe "ballots", under the
legislation, were not binding on the school bo...trds - they were advisory. to be included
with an analysis or"viability" criteria, in deciding which schools to close or remain open.
The boards were faced with the unenviable position of trying to explain to enraged
parents why they ignored local majorities in making their decisions.
During this time period. there was considerable heat resulting from the merged
school boards of the fonner Integrated and Roman Catholic School systems. Mixed in
the brew were the bumping rules in the NLTA collective agreement. Everything
appeared to shift from day to day. Animosity bernreen the "'Yes" and "No" sides was
rampant. No place "'as sacred - even attendance at a funeral could not subdue the
passions when the two sides came together each accusing the olher for the state of the
confusion. '>f
5.6.1 Court Injunction
On May 15, 1997, members and representatives of the Roman Catholic and
Pcntecostal Churches applied to the Supreme Court of Newfoundland for an injunction
against the school boards because the boards were I\ot properly constituted; and the
boards were under a duty to provide a uni-denominational school for all who demanded
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such. They also challenged the validity of the "negative option" registration process
where the boards recorded the instance of no registration being returned by a parent as
that parent preferring an interdenominational school.
In deciding whether to grant an interim injunction, the court must follow three
important steps: first, it must decide that there is a serious issue to be tried; second, it
must decide whether the applicant would suffer irreparable hann if the application were
refused; and finally, it must assess which of the parties would suITer greater harm from
the granting or refusing of the injunction until the court makes its final decision after trial.
On July 8, 1997, Justice Leo Barry gave his 60-page decision. 55 Both parties
accepted that there was a serious issue to be tried. As to the irreparable hann, Justice
Barry slated:
[40). ... r agree with the Applicants that toss ofa year's education in a uni-
denominational sehool is something which meets the test of "harm which can
neither be quantified in monetary terms or which cannot be cured [by damages]" set
out in RJR MacDonald, a p. 32. Since the right to education in a uni-
denominational school, at least when certain procedures are followed, has been
enshrined in the Constitution of Canada, this Court must conclude Parliament and
the Legislature regarded it as having some inherent value whose loss would be
irreparable in the above tenns.
The third part of the analysis required the court to detennine which of the parties
would suffer the greatest harm from thc granting or refusal of the injunction. In a
constitutional case such as this, the court had to took beyond the respective parties to the
general public. Both parties satisfied thc court that they represented interested members
of the public. Each presented "doomsday scenarios":
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[48J .... The Respondents and Inicryenor claim the school system will be in
chaos, if they are forced to change plans now finalized for September 1997. because
those plans are based upon decisions concerning the closure of certain schools. the
assignment of teachers. the transfer of students and the content of courses. Changes
concerning anyone school will cause a chain-reaction throughout the school
district, affecting other schools. The designation of schools as uni-denominational
or interdenominational played a significant role in determining ....il.ere teachers
would be assigned and which students would be in which schools. The substantial
decline in student population and the reduction in the number of teachers, which is
to occur for reasons unrelated to the school designation issue, aJso influenced
school board plans.
[49J The Applicants claim that, irthc matter must await triaJ, in addition to
the loss of one year's education in a uni-denominational school for some students, it
\vill not be practically possible to restore a truly denominational system of
education ifit is dismantled as ofSeptember I, 1997. Restoration would require
reinst3l1ation of equipment, reassignment of teachers, re-transfers of students and
reopening of closed school buildings.
Justice Barry then proceeded to consider which side was more likely to succeed at
triaJ. An analysis of the Schools Act was made to detennine whether it was "ultra vires"
that is. whether it was outside the jurisdiction of the legislature. Section 82 of&hoo/s
Act stated that, "3 school shall be an interdenominational school unless the requirements
set out in the regulations for designation as a uni-denominational school are satisfied'"
Justice Barry concluded that such wording was contrnty to Tenns 17(bXi), 17(c), 17(d),
and 17(e), which recognized a right in classes of person to have uni-denominational
schools publicly funded on a non-discriminatory basis. "Being "uniformly applicable" to
all schools is not sufficient." Justice Barry said. "A legislative provision would be ultra
YiI§ the legislature ifi! imposed a total ban upon uni-denominational schools or whut
would amount, in effect, to a tolal ban."S6
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Justice Barry ruled that once the Legisillture has accepted the wst of running a
denominational school system, .....by enshrining the right to a uni-dcnominational school
in thc Constitution, government cannot then tum around and effectively take away this
right by subordinating it completely to considerations of cost and efficiency."S7 Barry
was orthe view that ajudgc in trial would probably rule in favor orthe churches finding
that the legislation was in effect taking away or reducing the rights given by Term 17.
Barry ruled that the school designation process be suspended Wltil government held
school board elections and organized a new designation process, The new process would
ignore the ballots not returned instead of counting them as votes for interdenominational
schools.51 The practical implication of Barry's decision was enormous. Suddenly, the
school system was put into chaos - parents were Wlccrtain where their children would
attend, teachers were no longer sure in which school they would teach, and government
was again having to consult with church personnel on school matters. The public's view
was becoming galvanized - the time had come, in the minds of many, to settle the matter
once and forll!!.
"The irony of all of this," says Ed Roberts,
is that the Wells' Term 17 preserved a denominational system to some extent ~ very
substantial rights for the churches. In fact so much so that many ofus were worried
that we hadn't really accomplished very much. The churches challenged the
legislation that came after that on the ground that it was unconstitutional. It went
further than the Term 17 went and they were right Judge Leo Barry found them
right and there was no appeal. The resJXInse then was to change the constitution
again. So the irony of it, in my view, was that the Roman Catholic and I-'cntccostal
Assemblies killed the denominational education in Newfoundland. Now, as public
policy I welcome that.59
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Another bit of irony is that Roger Grimes actually predicted over a year earlier in
his comments to the Senate Constitutional Committee what would happen if the
government tried to frustrate the churches altempt to exercise their rights under the new
Tenn 17. "If we try to bring in a piece of legislation that is overly prescriptive, overly
restrictive and actually frustrates the different denominations in trying to exercise their
rights," Grimes said. "then we will be challenged in the courts and we will be defeated.'.60
That is what happened.
5.6.2 Reaction To Court Decision
Reaction to Justice Barry's decision was swift. 61 The government announced an
appeal (though it was never carried out) stating that the decision was wrong in "several
aspects." "The decision of Mr. Justice Barry has eflcctively placed the whole of the
school system in the hands of the two denominational representalives, Dr. Melvin
Regular for the Pentecostal Education Committee, and Dr. Bonaventure Fagan for the
Catholic Education Committee," the government's press release stated. Roger Grimes
said. "we need to get schools open for September and it is vcry frustrating to watch the
days tick by and still no notice to school boards as to what the intentions of these two
gentlemen may oc. [t is astonishing to see so much power vested in the hands of two
individuals. They arc holding up the whole system. ,,62
Commentators and e<litorial writers clamored for another referendum to clean up
the "mess". The Evening Telegram said, "Calt another referendum and ask the people of
the province a simple straightforward qucstion .... ,,63 "My first reaction to Justice Leo
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Barry's decision ..."wrote Peter BoswelL "was that here indt:ed is clear evidence ofthc
old expression that 'the law is an ass.' However after some reflection ... it was the
political process which was an ass, not thc law." Later in his article Doswell slated
government had been given anothcr chancc, "It's not too late for anothcr referendum, this
time with a simple question whose pas~ge would lead to a constitutional amendmcnt to
eliminate Tetm 17 cntircly.'..64 Others were not so sure referendum was the way to go as
il "would take years.'.65
Tobin, with an ever keen <:ar 10 the political wind. started publicly musing, "perhaps
it's time to go back and do it right this time.'M In the meantime. government started
polling the population for support of another referendum bid - it was obvious that another
go round would be a decisive win for the government and churches would be eliminated
altogether from the administration of schools. Belore making the announcement, both
Roger Grimes and Brian Tobin began meeting with a number of individuals from the
"Yes" side of the last referendwn campaign to help organize "a grassroots" effort to
convince the province of the need to rid the system of the churches.
In one such meeting before the sccond refcrendwn announcement, Tobin and
Grimes met with Jerry Vink of the Human Rights Association. They shared with Vink
the news that a referendum call would be forthcoming and they wanted assurance from
his organization that they would not raise the issue of minority rights. Vink assured them
that he would do his best. An executive meeting wa.~ hastily called at which the Human
Rights Association decided that it would not raise any issues concerning minority rights.
Ivan Morgan of the Human Rights Association explains.
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.. we told the Premicr that on the duration of the debate that we would remain
silcnt on minority education rights. Which is an issue under the Charter of Rights
and Freedoms. So we just didn't return their calls. I don't know how an acadcmic
or somebody with the timc and lcisure and the money could gct around and figure it
all out would view that. But that's true. That happened. I mean, I'm comfortable
with it- maybe we did a wrong thing. I don't know. But that's the level that the
agenda was being molded, massaged, spun by Mr. Tobin. He was very mueh in
comrol. How much in control? He'd be on thc T.V. saying Education First- as the
grass roots population came up out of nowhere, it's just a bunch of concerns,
criticism. But he'd be phoning in the evenings to see how things were going- most
evenings.61
Some members of the Human Rights Association board were not at ease with the
compromise but they came up with what Morgan called an "ethical spin". "The ethical
spin," he said,
was that we have spoken at length on education minority issues- we have nothing
more to say. And so we didn't feel compelled to begin again. The documents
exist- read them. We weren't going to get on camera any time during the campaign
and say, "well, they might have a point". Mr. Tobin and Mr. Grimes, you have to
understand, don't give a shit about poli sci issues. These guys just want 10 win.'>68
5.6.3 Referendum 1997 Campaign
On July 31, 1997. confident ora significant victory, with polls showing support and
a "grassroots effort organized," Premier Brian Tobin made a televised address
announcing the government's worst kept secret - there was going to be a referendum. It
would take place on September 2, 1997, just before school opened. The referendum
question was:
Do you support a single school system where all children, regardless of their
religious affiliation, attend the same schools where opportunities for religious
education and observances are provided?69
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Tobin's speech was noteworthy because it gave a clear indication that this time
round government would advocale its posilion to Newfoundland public. This was a shift
in poliey from Premier Wells who stepped back from the public dehale. Tobin also
appealed to the emotional issues of human rights and pluralism - issues that were nol
discussed to the same degree in the 1995 referendum. Gone was reference to the savings
and efficiency arguments. "I believe it's time to allow all of our children, Tobin staled,
of every denomination, 10 sit in the same classroom, in the same schools, to ride the
same bus, 10 play on the same sports teams, to live and to learn, together in the
samecommlUlity.
1believe it's time 10 hire our teachers because tbey're competenl, caring and
committed 10 our children ... not because of their religion
I belit':Ve it's time to elect our school board members because they will exercise
their best judgement on behalf of aII of us, not just on behalf of $Offie ofus.70
The "No" side recognizing that government was supporting the "Yes" campaign
and in particular the Education First group sought government funding. This was to be
rebuffed. "We knew," said Henley·Andrews.
thai government executive assistants were aClually helping in the Yes Means Yes
headquarters because we actually complained about it on a couple of occasions and
we had people go in and they would see Ihem there, right? We were looking for
funding on a fairm:ss basis and they were saying well they weren't providing
funding to either the Yes side or the "No" side but they were the Yes side. And
government employees and political employees were aClually in there working in
Ihe Yes Means Yes campaign.7\
Tobin responded witb a press release saying,
Government has received formal and informal requests for funding. It would be
unfair 10 respond to selected requests and fiscally irresponsible to respond to all of
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the many and varicd types of rcque~t~. I believe that it is incumbent upon
government to inform all Newfoundlanders and Labradorians of the fundamental
new direction being proposed for education. Therefore, government will promote its
position because it has a responsibility to do SO.72
"So," says Henley-Andrews, "it wasn't exactly a fair vote and a lot ofpcople were
totally demoralized on the "No" side by this time and had basically given up and of
course the result spoke for that."n
The "Yes" side was organized under the umbrella of Education First. Education
First was a coaJition of many diverse groups that got together for the purpose of
organizing the Yes side. The saying is that politics makes for strange bedfellows - in this
case Education First brought together old political foes from the New Democratic Party,
the Progressive-Conservative Party, and the Liberal Party. It also included such groups
as the Avalon Consolidated School Board, and The Home and School Federation.
Education First was the result of the work of Keith Coombs, a St. John's City
Councilor. He was known as, "The skipper. as we called him," said Ivan Morgan, '...he
was the one who madc thc big decisions and he made the big decisions in concen with
Mr. Grimes and Mr. Tobin. But we had input. There was certainly feedback. It wasn't
dictatorial- they didn't come down with tablets. They listened to us and we listened to
them.,,74
Not only did Education First have the support of government, but it became the
focal point for everyone sympathetic to the "Yes" side. Teachers, parents and others
''just came off the street" to help whcrever they could. Oonagh O'Dea, president of
Education First noted, "We come from all denominations, faiths and persuasions
95
including Catholics, Integrated faiths and non.adherenlS:'" Each night Keith Coombs
would gather the group in a back room of their headquarters 10 debrief on the daily events
and plan strategy for the following day. This gave continuity and focus.
Morgan entenainingly states whal the atmosphere working with Education First
was like:
This is just a bunch of political sluts who saw a chance for a really good romp and
went for it. This was the greatest political experience in my life. We had a ball.
Whenever in my life am I going to hear someone "Ivan, Fred Rowe on line one for
you!" Or to watch Ross Reid's mother, Margo, and Donnie Hickey's brother, Joe.
sit down and divide St. John's East up at a table together. I mean we are lalking the
most mortal political enemies. For 3 or 4 short weeks everybody got along like a
r60use afire. We had a great time. Then we all went back fighting each other again.
Education First was focused on the St. John's area. It simply did not have the
means to go much beyond the metro area. However, within three weeks it had leaneted
some 70,000 homes and enlisted several hundred volunteers,n It conducted a generol
public poll in the Avalon East area and for referendum day il organized rides to the polls
- though many of those who were scheduled to dri"e .....ere idle for most of the day. lbe
group also sent leuers to each of the MHAs asking lhal they publicly state which .....ay
they .....ould ,'ote in the September 2 referendum.
Taking the example of Premier Tobin's "I Believe Speech" on July 31 to the public,
Education First argued more than inefficiencies of a parallel system but induded human
rights issues.
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In their advertisements they stated:
What We Believe
School should be about learning and bright, productive futures for
children;
Schools should be neighbourhood schools;
Religious observances should be permitted, and religious education
should be available;
Hiring of all teachers should be based on qualifications and experience
alone;
All our schools must be able to strive for excellence;
Our tax dollars are best spent by investing in one good school system.78
These arguments obviously resonated with the public.
"I have to say I was disturbed by stories of teachers who are being advised that their
services were no longer required merely because they were the wrong religion," Liberal
backbencher Gerald Smith said, He voted No in 1995 but voted Yes in 1997. 79 He may
have bl.-en referring to the situation at the Deer Lake Pentecostal School. In the spring
and early summer of 1997, a number of tcachcrs who lost their positions as a result of the
consolidation of schools under the refoml process were denied positions in the Deer Lake
Pentecostal School because they were not members ofthe Pentecostal Church. To the
public, this became anathema. The public was becoming less tolerant of arguments why
the exclusive nature ofa denominational school was necessary. The Integrated churches
asked the PentecostaJ denominational committee to forgo their legal right to refuse
teachers on the basis of religion - but there was no response.so
As time got closer to the September vote, the "Yes" side had more public
supporters, including thc mainline churches. Anglican Bishop Donald Harvey publicly
stated he would be voting yes and was pleased that the government had called another
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referendwn, sUlling thai a single scbool system would "be an extension of what we ha\"C
accomplished since 1969 in the Inlegrnted church school system 10 include all churches
presently invoh'ed in education:,11 Lt.-Col. Shirley RoWS(:ll. of the Salvation Army
supported the government's approac:h because ..... it ,",,'Quid be an eXlension of what the
Inlegrnted churches have been doing over the years...a2 Many different groups, such as
Ihe NLTA, school councils, Home and School Federation and prominent cilizens began
popping up making pronouncements of support of the "Yes" side.n "What a
eonlrasl ....," said an edilorial belwecn the 1995 and the 1997 rcrercndwns, "More and
more, people who have a public presence in the province arc nailing their colors 10 the
mast ofa common. although Chrislian, education system."ll4
On August 25, Tobin announced the new Term 17. It was slraightforward. The
Iegislalure of Newfoundland wouJd "have exclusive aUlhorily to make laws in relation 10
education. but shall provide for eourses in religion Ihal are not specific to a religious
denomination." Religious observances would aJso be permilted in a school, "where
requested by parents."as Once announced. aJl of the Inlegrated churches voiced support
of the new Term 17.16
5.6.4 The DO "No" Cllmp3ign
One of the slrange twists of fate during Ihe 1997 referendum "''as the absence of an
organized "No" c:lmp:lign. During the 1995 referendum. the Roman Catholic and
Pentecostal Churches organized a campaigned patterned after an election effort - and as
noted above hired such experienced eJection organizers as Leo Power. What happened in
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1997? Henley-Andrews says, " ... the churches had spent a considerable amount of
money fighting the first referenda never anticipating they would have to fight a second
one particularly within a year and the resources just wasn't there the second time round.
I mean the money just \\~dStl't there...&7 1be question remains "Why wasn't the money
there?" Did the churches no longer have the money or was it simply a maner of thro\\ing
in the proverbiallowel? No one really knows - it remains one of the mysteries.
A number ofpeop1c working on the "Yes" side with Education First did not know
what to think of the lack of organization on the "No" side. ''The (Avalon East) School
Board people working with "Yes Means Yes" ... couldn't believe there waso'ta massive
conspiracy against us," said Steve Wolinetz. "We had no opposition. I eouid see that,
Keith Coombs could see it, others could. You know three weeks into the so-called
"campaign". which didn't have a great deal of reach. We could barely reach out ofSt.
John's and around a bit into Conception Bay South. It seemed quite apparent to us that
there "'1lS no opposition but they had been so used to dealing with these people on the
board... the Avalon East Boord has always been a snake pit... The reality was thai they
(the pro-dcnominational education members on the board) didn't represent many people
but they represented more than they ended up with.... '...
5.6.5 Referendum Day
On September 2. 19Q7. 72.7 percent of the Newfoundlanders voting answered the
call by giving government a clear mandate to reform the systcm.ll9 In his address to the
province, Tobin slated that. ••... there will be no unidenominational schools, no
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interdenominational schools, no Integrated schools... no Catholic, no Pentecostal schools
..just one single school system for all of our children." No longer any confusion about
what the referendum meanl- the churches this time were out "period."
From hindsight Phil Warren suggests,
Perhaps it might be said [the churches] hlew it. If two or three of the denominatiol15
thai ultimately went to court and fought tlte reforms - if they had agreed to some
kind of compromise at that point in time there may not have been a second
referendum and the second clear question which called for a non-denominational
system or an inter-denominational system may not have been put. But I think they
~~~~~e:~rhaps they overestimated their power with the public and with the
Of course, the "No" side would disagree. What they say is that the Wells'
Government gave them limited rights to denominational schools but when they sought to
exercise those rights they were faced with another referendum and a no win situation.
5.7 Conclusion
It took seven years for the governments of Clyde Wells and Brian Tobin to remove
churches from the education system. It was a tortuous affair that ended in a dramatic
fashion. Confusion was acute. The churches struggled to maintain their rights - and it
appeared that the more they struggled the more they lost. Public opinion had clearly
favoured a single school system. While the government of Clyde Wells cautiously
approached reform fenTing the repercussions or taking on the churches head on, the
government of Brian Tobin was able to aggressively move ahead with eliminating the
churches altogether.
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for Ed Roberts, Tobin gOI as far as he did because of the Wells administration. "[
think if the Wells' Administration could have gone that far we would have," said Roberts.
"We didn't think public opinion would support it and that is really what it is all about. ..
Would we have been able to get support for Ihal? I don't think so, I don't think so, but I
think Brian was able to gel it after what had happened to the compromised one.',91 We
now move our study toward the analysis of the policy community.
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Chaptcr6
THE EDUCATIONAL REFORM POLICY COMMUNITY
6.1 Introduction
This chapter oullines the educational rcfonn policy community in Newfoundland
during the 1989·1998 time period. It identifies the members of the community, the
relationships between the different actors, and the institutional characteristics of the
groups seeking to influence policy. All of this is oonsidered keeping in mind thc mOOel
of Pross as outlined in Chapter 3.
6.2 Policy Community Characteristics
Stephen Wilks and Maurice Wright define a policy community as "a group of actors
or potential actors ... whose community membership is defined by a common policy
focus...1 As noted earlier, Pross has characterized these aclors into two segments: one.
the subgovernment, which is the policy-making body in the field; and two, the attentive
public, being those groups who are not in the inner cirele: while interested in the policy
issue, they are not participating on a regular basis.
6.2.1 Members of the Policy Community
The rivers of interest that convcrged around the system of education in
Newfoundland during the time frame of this study. The policy community consisted of
three distinct groups: the provincial government, Ihe churches. and public interest groups
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based mainly in the province. lben: were a number of national groups that sought to
influence the provincial government on education, but !hey did not playa major role
other than use what influence they had to exen pressun: on the federal government not to
acquiesce to the Newfoundland go"enunenfs request for constitutional change. Within
the provincial government, the Premier, the Education Minister, the Depanment of
Education, and Cabinet were the ultimate decision makers, but other departments had a
role in the process at different times. For instance. the Department of Justice ""as very
actively involved in seeking legal opinions and assisting in strategizing on the
constitutional issues involving the education reform debate.
While it was under the premiership of Brian Tobin that the churches lost all ofthcir
constitutionaJ rights in education. the respondents identified Premier Clyde Wells as the
most significant actor in education refonn. Other prominent actors in the Department of
Education that were prominent in the debate identified by the respondents of this study
included: Dr. Philip Warren. who not only taught at Memorial University and was the
ehair of the Warren Commission in the 196Os, but was the Minister of Education;
Warren's successors, Chris Decker, a former United Church minister turned
businessman, and Roger Grimes, a former President of the Newfoundland & Labrador
Teachers Association. had a major impact on education refonn. Others of note include:
Dr. Leonard Williams, the chairperson of the Williams Conunission, who served for a
time as the [kputy Minister of the Department; and Dr. Robert Crocker, who resigned al'
Oean of Education and left his Memorial University professorship to be the Assistant
Deputy Minister.
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Outside of government there were two groups of actors that SOUghl to influence the
government: those th3t wanted to reform education within the denominational education
system and those who wanted to get rid of the denominational system in the process of
reforming education. The Roman Catholic Church, the Pentecostal Church, and the
Seventh-day Adventist Church all were willing 10 seek education reform. but only to the
extent that the rcform would 3110w the churches to maintain their constitutional rights in
education. lbese churches played a prominent role in mobilizing their constituents to
support denominational education. They were assisted by the three Denominational
Education Councils (Roman Catholic DEC, Pentecostal DEC. and Integrated DEC). 'nlc
churches making up the Integrated DEC (Anglican Church, Presbyterian Church,
Salvation Army, and United Church) were at first ambiguou.<; as 10 their desire to relain
their constitutional rights: eventually mosl supported the Government's initiatives to end
denominational education.
The ewfoundland & Labrador Teachers' Association (NLTA) had long supported
ridding education of church control and influentt. The NLTA sponsored public forums
10 debate the issue, As we will see below, the NLTA \\13S also the training ground for
many of the bureaucrats in the Department of Education who were involved in
developing policy and strotegy.
Other public interest groups included such organizations as the Yes Means Yes
CommitteelEducation Firsl. Newfoundland and Labmdor '·Iome and School Federation,
Newfoundland and Labrador Human Rights Association, SI. John's Board of Trade, and
Alliance for Choice in Education. Thcse groups were concemed with human rights,
107
economic, social, cultural. and educ·ational issues that were not being addressed in the
refonn process to their satisfaction.
6.2.2 The Pluralist/Policy Community Model
The policy community that emerged around the issue of education reform included a
number of provincial government departments, the education community. non-
government organizations, public interest groups, national organizations and other
individuals with an interest in the system such as parents, teachers and students.
As we have seen, Pross argues that a policy community consists of two
compartments: the sub-government and the attentive public. The sub-government
contains the actors involved in policy-making. It consists ofthc government agency most
directly involved in setting policy and representatives ofa few institutionalized interest
groups. The attentive public is composed of government agencies, public interest groups,
and individuals such as academics who seek to influence policy but are unable to break
into the inner circle.
The most visible actors in the sub-government included: the Ministers of Education,
the Williams Commission, the Department of Justice, the church leaders, the Planning
and Priorities Committee of Cabinet, the Cabinet, and the NLTA. The NLTA and the
church leaders by way of the DECs are perfect examples of what Pross calls
institutionalized private sector groups. By virtue of their power and influence they have a
seat fairly close to the decision makers.
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Pross has observed that the Cabinet, at least at the federal level. is the final decision
maker. In this study, there appears to have been a concentration of power with the
Premier and the Priorilies and Planning Committee ("P&P Committee") of Cabinet that
appears to be somewhat at odds with Pross's view. lbe author has discovered that the
Premier worked very closely with the P&P Committee in negotiations with the churches
and in deciding what course of action govemment would follow. "With Clyde Wells,"
says Decker, "the Planning and Priorities became more of an executive. The role of the
P&P Committee under Clyde was much stronger than under Tobin... It was that
committee that was doing the day to day negotiations ...."2 Ultimately, however, Cabinet
made the final decision. Thus, while the researcher has put the Cabinet at the centre of
the policy community in Figure 6-1, it must be remembered that the P & P Committee
played a very prominent role.
As the education refonn process gathered momentum, more provincial departments
became involved. The Department of Justice became very involved in the meetings with
the P&P Committee and the church leaders to deal with constitutional issues on the rights
of education. The Department of Finance was called upon to provide accounting
estimates of the savings that would be expected from different refonns to the system.
The Williams Commission attracted a large nwnber of the attentive public to speak on the
issue. As the debate raged and different political moves were made, a number of
individuals in the attentive public began to organize. Parents and teachers supporting the
Roman Catholic schoob organized into Alliance For Choice in Education, while parents
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and teachers opposed to denominational rights organized the Yes Means Yes Commiuee
after the first referendum of 1995.
It soon became obvious that some sectors had more influence on the policy than
others. II is fair to say that prior to the first referendum of 1995, the Churches were
influential in that the Wells' government was cautious in its attempt at reform and
provided a means for the churches to maintain, 10 a limited degree, the right to have
unidenominational schools.
At the same time, the NLTA also had the ear of the government through the
bureaucracy within the Department of Education and was playing a major role in pushing
government policy. Len Williunlsnoted that the NLTA, ·... brought forth the weaknesses
of Ihe denominational system.]
6.2.3 The Role of Go\'ernmenl in the PoLk)' Community
1be provincial government by virtue of5ection 9) (including Term 17 of the
Neltfoundland Act) of the Constitution ACI, 1867, is responsible for making and
implementing education policy. From the education reforms of the late 1960s to the early
199Os, an increasing number of calls for funher education reform were being made.
Governmem was strapped in its ability to unilaterally change the education system
without infringing upon one or more of the constitutional rights of the religious
denominations. To seck change, the government was forced by the Constitution to seek
the agreement of the religious denominations. For those desiring change. this was an
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impediment that had to be removed. Even within the Department ofEducalion, there Yt'llS
frustration with how the system operated.
Most individuals within the Depanmcnt of Education had a teaching background and
many had experience with the NLTA - they had a first hand expericllCC of how the
system operated. To many, the system was lacking and needed refonn. Len Williams
noted. "So the Department of Education was very supponive of change I mean
recognizing that for many these people in there - the consultants, the curriculum
consultants - that was their role to advocate change. They saw themselves as setters of
goals.''''
It was the provincial government's appointment of the Williams Royal Commission,
at the behest of Dr. Phil Warren, as noted above, to study the education system and
recommend changes that led to the education refonn of the 1990's.
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Figure 6·1 The Newfoundland Education Policy Community PriorTo 1995
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6.2.4 Major Actors
6.2.4.1 CI}'dc Wells
While it was ultimately Premier Brian Tobin who called for the second referendum
on education in 1997, effectively removing all churches from the education system, all of
the respondents in this study have pointed to Clyde Wells as the major actor in this whole
debate_ He was described as the "catalyst." the person who detennincd the agenda. Over
and over when asked who or what group sct the agenda, respondents from both interest
groups and government put Clyde Wells as number one. Perhaps the best example was
given by Chris Decker who, during the interview, described what happened one day in
the Legislature while he and Clyde Wells were in the Opposition and Brian Peekford was
Premier. There was a remark from one of the Liberal opposition against the
denominational system. Decker tells the story,
To which Peckfordjumps up and "Mr. Speaker," he says, "does the opposition want
us to abolish denominational education?" Clear out, you know, let's get this on the
table. And we were like a bunch of cowards ~ ever}'one of us ",'ere frightcned right
to death because we thought the chureh had all this power and no one could change it
you know. It was only after, I don't know what gave us the power, maybe it was the
fact that Clyde was prepared to look at it.~
On April 15, 1969, during the debate on the introduction ofa new Education Act
brought in by the Smallwood government, Clyde Wells made a vcry poignant speech on
why the Act should not pass. It was his argument that the Act allowed for duplication of
schools in the small Newfoundland communities and thereby reduced the facilities
available to the students - there would not be enough money for a gymnasium, a
laboratory, etc. -T1lus, the education of the children would be compromised. It is also
II]
imcrcsting to note that during this 1969 debate, Wells advocated establishing a
commission to travel the province and obtain the views of the people and to bring the
mattertoareferendum.
I suggested, however, that a Select Committee might well be set up to hear the views
of the people in this province on the necessity for and the possibility of finding a
way, a means, to have complete consolidation of our efforts in the field of education
and if possible or if deemed appropriate or advisable prepare alternatives that might
appear on a referendum to be placed before the people.6
What is striking about Wells's 1969 speech is his very personal story of his and his
family's educational experience growing up in Newfoundland, how he struggled through
university because he did not have a language course while in secondary school, how his
brothers and sisters were unable to go to university. Listening to the different
respondents in this study, reading the debates in thc Legislature, the researcher realized
that Wells was not alone in his passion. The actors in this debate may not only have
objective philosophical, logical or economic arguments about education reform, but
underlying those are reallilc experiences that has helped shape the debate. "I can only
surmise," says Wayne Noseworthy, of the NLTA, "that they shared on an individual basis
and I suppose collectively as a government and as an administmtion or as a caucus really,
the types of views that we had as an organization .. it was time for radical change ... I
mean these people grew up in the system.,,7
·I1le same passion exhibited in the 1969 speech was evident 20 years later as Premier.
Wells wanted change and was determined to put the matter on the agenda to be dealt with
one way or another. There has been some speculation about whether he wanted to get rid
II'
of the denominational system altogt:tht:r or wht:ther ht: was simply imerested in reform
for the sake of efficiency and economy. Chris Decker claims to have been the radical in
Well's cabinct who wanted the denominational system abolished altogether. Decker
notes that at one point early in the process he was in an argument with Wells over the
pace of change. Decker fclt Wclls was dragging his fect,
[t wa~ just thc two of us in the room. I accused him of not going far enough and that
he was too slow with it. He sort of thought I was being 100 hasty you know. I just
remember bils and pieces of the conversation but one sentence he said was, "Look, I
want to go just as far as you do but can we takc the chance?" What he was afraid of
was if we go for broke, get the churches out, go for the referendum get them out of
the system, he was afraid we would lose. And he said, "If we lose the referendum it
will be fifty years before you get another government who has got the nerve to even
tackle the issue again." And I suppose he was right.
Decker further Slated, "Had they (the churches with the rights) said, 'We're prepared to
go with one inter-dcnominational system and make provisions for Ihe non-adherents to
have representation on the boards' - I think Clyde Wells would have jumped for it."
From all of this it would appear that Clyde Wells's approach was to have a one school
system, preferably a non-denominational system, but failing that a one inter-
denominational system.
"It demanded some C{)urage," says Phil Warren, "on the government to decide to
take this issue on."~
6.2.4.2 Williams Commission
The appointment of the Williams Commission in 1990 provided the govemment an
opportunity to educate the public about the issues facing education. Dr. Phil Warren,
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while Minister of Education under Clyde Wells., convinced Cabinet to appoint another
commission to study education. "'One of the argwnents,.. says Warren, "for using a
commission of course is that it involves other people who arc "expert"; it provides
visibility; it provides an opportunity for public participation and perhaps public
education...9 The Williams Commission played a pivotal role in bringing education
reform to the public forefront
The final recommendlltions of the Commission sct the terms of the debate for the
ensuing years. II was the llltcmpt by government to implement the recommendations
concerning the denominational aspect of the education system that Jed to the very
contentious struggle between the churches and government - finally leading to the two
referenda that removed the churches altogether.
The government respondents saw the Commission's repon as confirming their
suspicions as 10 the ailments of the denominational system. The church respondents on
the other hand saw the Commission as a smoke serren by a government that was intent
on removing their constitutional rights from the outset. 'The LTA saw the Commission
as a fulfillment of their long time demand 10 government for such a study and was long
overdue.
The Commission's primary role was to outline the frnme of reference for the
government to follow in pursuing education refonn. The Commission'5 repon became
the government's yardstick to measure all outcomes by.
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6.2.4.3 The Chunheli
lbe churches were a divided lot and at times faced internal divisions between clergy
and laity. l11e churches consisted oftwo camps. ....-hile the Government saw them as one
group. One camp favored the denominational system - they were the Roman Catholic,
Pentecostal, and Seventh-day Adventist Churches. The churches in the other camp were
either indifferent to or openly against the denominational system - they included the
Anglican, United, Salvation Anny, and Presbyterian Churches. known as the "Integrated
churches." It is interesting to note that in the minds of government the churches were
lumped together in onc pot. Very little negotiation occurred one on one between the
government and one church at a time. The government approached them and met with
them as a single group. 10
The divisions between the Integrated churches and the other three churches became
more evident as lime went on. During the early negotiations with government, the
churches appeared to have a common front. So much so that members of the government
felt that their own churches "let them down". For instance Chris Decker, who was once a
United Church minister, never "forgave" his church for supporting the denominational
system during the early negotiations when the official United Church policy was in favor
of one secular public system of education. "It was hypocritical," said Decker, "they
really failed.,,11 The common front did not come easily. 11lere were a lot of discussions
between the Integrated churches and the others over the issue. At one point. Dr. Hector
Swain. leader of the United Church, openly stated, during a mccting of the church
leaders, that it was a great opportunity to finally get rid of the denominational system.
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1be DEC leaders convinced him it ....'Quld never be a good lime lo get rid of lhe systcm
and he gave tacil support. Another leader ",110 was vehemenlly opposed to the publicly
supporte.d denominational syslem replaced Swain. 12
TIle Integraled Church leaders were often in an embamLssing sil\Jalion after having
agreed with the other church leaders on strategy and policy vis-a-vis the government,
only 10 face a hostile church membership. The Presbyterians had to back track on at least
one occasion, because their lay members rejectcd the churches' proposal to government,
believing it was not going to save government enough money.IJ There were other
incidents where the Intcgrated Church leaders were at odds with their own &lueation
Council personnel. George Morgan noted his discussion with Dr. Tom Pope of the
Integrated Education Council. "It was quite a shock to him to discovcr all these years he
thought he was doing something worthwhile for the Anglicans and during the referendum
he was made aware the church leaders - the Archbishop and the Synod couldn't care less
about losing their education. He realized that his agenda and theirs was quite different."'·
By the time the second referendum was called by Premier Brian Tobin, the
Integrated churches were publicly calling on the Pentecostnl Church not to exercise their
constitutional rights. 15 The Roman Catholic respondents noted with some disdain that
they lost their constitutional righls duc in no small part to whal they viewed as the
intransigcnce of the Integrated churches.
Gerry Fallon staled Ihat during the discussions hctween the churches and governmcnt
after the Williams Commission repon, government was prepared to allow for the
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continuation of Catholic and Pentecostal schools where numbers warrant if the Integmted
schools became the geneml school system. He states,
1bey (the Integrated churches) said, "We'll give up our rights in education if the
Catholics and Pentecostals give up theirs." So there was a real problem at that
particular time and in my view and I believe it to this day that we lost our systcrn
because the Integr.ued denominations did not wish to see the denominational system
continue but were not willing to allow us to have our schools. our Catholic schools
and the Pentecostals have their schools. 16
The Roman Catholic and the Pentecostal Churches led the charge for the right to retain
denominational schools. While the Seventh-day Adventist Church also sought to
maintain the right, it was too insignificant in size and influence to hold much sway over
the govemment. "[The Seventh.day Adventist] cause," said Decker, "was totally
unrealistic.,,17
6.2.4.4 N~(oundland & LabndorTeachen Association
Founded in 1890. the Newfoundland and Labrador Teachcrs' Association is the
tC3Chers lalx>r union for the province. It currently has 8,000 members., \\;th offices
located in St. John's. 1be Association provides numerous services to teachers through
various professional divisions. 1be NLTA has an Executive Council consisting of 12
members. 52 Branches and 21 Spcciallnterest Councils. The Association is affiliated
with Education International (EI). representing teachers around the world, and the
Canadian Teachers' Federation (CTF), representing thc 220,000 teachers in Canada.
The NLTA played a pivotal role in the education reform. For years. the NLTA had
fomented for fefoon. In 1986. lhe NLTA organized a conference on the educalion
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system in Newfoundland. The conference galhered "all of the major players" togelher
and theNLTA used the forum asa public staging of their views. 18 Two areas ofrcfonn
were necessary for the NLTA - one was duplication associated with the denominational
system and the second was the human rights issues of the teachers.
In May 1986, the NLTA submitted a brief to the provincial government entitled
"Exploring New Pathways" that outlined the need 10 review the flaw ofthe education
syslem. The flaw of"isolation by denomination" if not cOrrected. they argued, would
ultimately "lead to the dismantling of the system." The NlTA was willing to allow a
"church-influenced education" but demanded that refonn of the system for ~the best
possible education" was necessary. The brief then concluded:
The provincial government should establish a Royal Commission with the broad
mandate of examining the administrative and economic disadvantage of the current
denominational system and provide recommendations for improvemcnt. 19
The Peckford Government assured the NLTA that such a study would be carried out.
but Government soon changed hands and the NLTA had to get the ear of Clyde Wells
and Phil Warren.20 That, in the end, was not too difficult.
Wayne Noseworthy, the current Executive Dire<;tor of the NLTA, argued that the
NLTA was "THE main lobby force to see that we had a system that was based on
functionality as opposed 10 denominationalism.,,21 Len Williams, who not only served as
the chair of the Williams Commission, bUI served at one time as president of the NLTA,
stated that the NLTA "brought forth the weaknesses of the denominational system."
They were appalled at the treatment of teachers by the denominations - teachers were
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being fired because they changed religions or married outside of their religious
communion. Such things "in the late 1980s, 19905 was an anathema to society."
Williams continued,
But that wasn't their only concern - the denominations. They were really concerned
about under resourcing, protection of teachers. inadequate number of teachers, and
they were the most organized and best financed and politically best organized
organization to articulate because they had a tremendous reputation with the media
and in the province and a very powerful, powerful influence with politicians.22
While the NLTA is credited wilh having called on government to establish a Royal
Commission to study the denominational system, they were not seeking to abolish the
system altogether. What they wanted, says Wayne Noseworthy was a "unified system"
and a system that would respect the human rights of the teachers. "I think the radical
change, the very swift change that came about, you know, particularly with regard to the
two referenda surprised cverybody, including ourselves.',23
From the govenunent's perspective, the NLTA did not help them during the
referenda debates. Chris Decker said unequivocally the NLTA did not play
any part whatsoever. They're pretending dlat they did but they played none. They
were frightened right to death. They would only comment when they were
absolutely certain that they had the majority support of the people. I used to get
phonc calls from people who said there Catholic teachers and Pentecostal teachers,
and I believe they were and they'd say, "Look Decker I cannot, I'm afraid to go
public it's my job, but for god's sake," and I remember one guy was passionate - I'm
sure he was a teacher, he didn't give me it name but he said, "You're the only thing
that stands between them and us...
But the official position ofche NTA (sic) was so compromised they didn't want to
offend the Catholics, didn't want to olTend the Pentecostals, didn't want to atTend the
Integrated. The only time they took a firm sland I believe was after. Even in the
referendum remember they didn't play any active stand in the first referendum we
had and I am not even aware of them playing a major role in the second referendum.
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So the NfA (sic) cannot take any credit for this, in my opinion. In my opinion !hey
could have, they had an opportunity. but I suppose NTA (sic) represented Catholic,
Pentecostal, and Integrated teachers and they just couldn't come out and be as strong
as individual teachers would have liked so they tried to have a position that was so
compromised th:1t it \\'as really no bener than the one that the United Church held
because its position was so compromised that !hey sold lhemseh"es so short.H
While the NLTA may not have assisted the government during the education debate
(or at least to the government's expectation), it did lay the groundwork for the debate. It
is suggested that without the NLTA's insistence on reronn throughout the years, the
government may not hove dealt with the issue. The words, "may not" are used because
we cannot overstme the role that personality played in the whole scheme of things-
namely Clyde Wells. Would refonn have happened anyway were it not for Clyde Wells?
Wayne Noseworthy is orthe view that change was inevitable simply because of the loss
ofstodent population. and the shrinking outport communities,2' While change may have
been inevitable because of demographics and economics. the Iota! removal of churches
from tbe system was not necessarily inevitable.
6.2.5 Minor Acton
6.2.5.1 Federation de parent francophone de Terre-Neu\'c el du Labrador
This group was primarily interested in maintaining their own specific linguistic
rights under the Constitution. They wanted Ihe assurance from government that a
fr.mcophone school board would be established 10 protect their linguistic rights. They got
that assurance on February 28, 1997, when Premier Tobin and Deputy Prime Minister
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and Minister of Canadian Heritage Sheila Copps announced a six-year agreement to
suppon the CSlablishment of a francophone school board.26 "I've been involved in this
since the mid-70s," said Joe Benoit, principal of Ecole St. Anne's all grade school in
Mainland, "and OUT ultimate gooJ was to get governance for OUT own schools, which we
did...l1
6.2.5.2 "Yes Means Yes" Committee - Education First
This ad hoc group aro!<iC after the first referendum. Their existence is further
evidenl,;c ofthc confusion surroundinl=\ the referendum question of 1995. Many people
were of the view that the results of the 1995 referendum meant that churches no longer
had any righlS with respect to school administration. When it appeared that government
was going to ailow some Pentecostal and Catholic schools to still exist, the "Yes Means
Yes Comminee" was organized to put public pressure on the government oot to allow
any public church run schools to exist.
When the 1997 referendum was called. the Yes Means Yes Commineejoined up
with the Human Rights Association and the Home and School Federation to form the
"Education FinlC group.l. This group, while non.partisan. was nevertheless seen as
supportive of the government and at one point the government considered funding them -
but never did. 29 Its membership was ad hoc - and soon after the referendum the group
disbanded having accomplished their objective of a Yes victory. The finances were
sparse ~ there were a number ofprivatc donations of such things as use of cell phones
and office space. but no substantial means of any sort.
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6.2.5.3 Newfoundland and L.abrador Home and School Federation
This group was made up of parents and teachers concerned about the financial
resolllttS of the schools. The Home and School Federation was a Federation of Home
and School Associations. usually 4()..50 of them.JO Though they did not have a major role
in influencing government policy, they were seen as sympathetic to government's cause
ofrcfonn. Very limited in financial resources. they did havc significant leadership.
Professor Steve Wolinetz of Memorial University's Department of Political Science was
idcntified by a number of respondents as being involved as a public spokesperson. His
role was to keep the issue on the agenda. As Decker pointed out, the teachers amongst
the membership of the Home and School Fcderation were loathe to publicly state their
vie\\'S. "You could get the individual member of the Home and School Association
(sic)," said Decker, "who thought we were doing the right thing but they had the official
party line to stand by....J1 Wolinetz had the freedom to speak without fear of losing his
job, as others in the Federation could nol.
6.2.5.4 Newfoundland and Labrador Human Right! Association
This organi .....ation was founded in 1969, wilh one or its main goals being the removal
of churches from any influence or control in the education system. Government saw their
public pronouncemelltS as counler-productive. They were radical and seen by
government as a hindrance to the cause of education refonn. "I used to like what they
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were saying." said Chris Decker, "I believe lhey were right," Out the problem was what
they were saying "weren't the right lhings to be saying in the middle of the debate."n
6.2.5.5 51. John's Board of Trade
Government saw the Board ofTmde as allies but not of any real force. 1lley were
concerned that the system provide an education that would ensure that the work force of
the province was competitive in the new technologies.
6.2.5.6 Alliance for Choice in Education
This Roman Catholic group, led by 51. John's lawyer Janet Henley-Andrews, was
supportive ofthe Church rights to a publicly funded education system. They recognized
that in the outlying areas of the province there had to be an elimination ofduplication -3
greater sbaring of the resources 10 ensure proper education facilities. However, in the
larger centres such as St. John's, Comer Brook, Grand Falls, and Gander, they argued
that the populations were sufficient to allow for the running of 5eparnte church schools,
Though a small group, they were nevertheless successful in appearing before the
p.'lrliamenlat)' committees, and participating in interviews on redia and television. For
being a small group they were a vocal group. While they felt they had influence with
government. the government thought otherwise, "Alliance For Choice meant one thing to
Ihat particular group:' said Chris Docker, "but it did not mean the same thing for me
because to me there was no choice."))
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6.3 Institutional Characteristics
Analysis of a group's institutional characteristics. according to Pross, indicates its
potential for influence. Characteristics such as membership, resources, organizational
structure and outputs (i.e. newsletters, briefs, and delegations) explain the group's ability
to influence government. While the information on the major and minor players is nOI
exhaustive, il is, nevertheless, sufficient to enable the researcher to come up with
generalizations that arc helpful. To be more accurate, one would have to go beyond the
overview presented by this study.
6.3.1 Membership
When analyzing the memberships oflhe groups in our study, we are able to establish
Ihefollowing:
Table 6-1 Interest Group Membershin
Roman Catholic Church
An liean Church
United Church
Pentecostal Church
Presbvterian Church
Salvation Armv
Seventh-dav Adventist Church
NLTA
Yes Means Yes Committee-Education First
Human Rights Association
Federation des oarcnt franco hones
Home and School Federation
Alliance For Choice
209,000·
148,000·
97,000·
40,000·
2,200·
44,350·
700"
8,000"·
No set membership 30
: oeoole at averaae meetinl!: i
No set membership 15 on
Board elected at annual
meetinl!?~ii
Unknown
40·50 iii
No set membership
I arouo of 20 iv
"Slallstlcs Canada, 1991 Censu~, "SDA Church III Newfoundland & Labrador. "·Wayne Noseworthy
i Ivan Morgan. ii Ivan Morgan. iii Steve Wolinetz iv Janet Henley-Andrews.
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6.3.2 Resources
Those groups involved in the education debate can be classified into two distinctive
parts - "the haves" and "the have-nots". Among the haves would be the churches and the
NLTA. They had the finances, the personnel and the volunteer support that other groups
could only dream about. lbe have-nots included the Human Rights Association, the
Home and School Federation, Yes Means Yes Committee, and Alliance For Choice In
Education. However, such have-nots did have access to government, media, and a very
competent volunteer pool. The resource capacity of the Metis Association and the
Federation des parent francophones has not been established. However, given that it was
not until February 1997 that the Federation de parent francophone received government
funding, speculation is that there was very limited funding.
6.3.2.1 Finances
There can be no doubt that the churches (particularly the Roman Catholic and
Pentecostal Churches) had the financial wherewithal to get the expertise to produce
policy papers, legal opinions of their respective positions in the debate, the personncllo
lobby the government, and to take part in a public awareness campaign. This was
particularly evident during the first referendum process. During the first referendum in
1995. the Roman Catholic and Pentecostal Denominational Committees hired Leo Power
and nine others to organize a political campaign for the "No" side?!
During the second referendum in 1997, the churches did not organize a l:ampaign. It
appeared the churches had run out ofsteum and money to fight. J6 However, the "Yes"
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side in the 1997 referendum were organized, and while they did not receive direct
funding there were indirect funds going their way - they received such things as cell
phones to assist in their campaign.
By 1997, the Integrated churches ",·ere clearly on the Yes side and the Roman
Catholic, Pentecostal, and the Seventh-day Adventist Churches were without the financial
assistance of the Denominational Educational Committees. It should also be remembered
that under the Income Tax Act, the churches. in order t.o maintain charitable status. are
limited in their political involvement.37 Nevertheless, with the exception of government
and the NLTA, the churches were the only groups with the means to obtain the legal
counsel and personnel within the church school boards devoted to the issue of education
refonn. They had the capability to research issues, consult their membership, lobby
government, and gain an expertise into the complexities of government maneuvers during
therefonn process.
The Human Rights Association; Yes Means Yes Committee-Education First. Parent
des Francophone, Home and School Federation, and Alliance For Choice had very
limited funding. They had no choice but rely upon volunteers who were ideologically
and philosophically on their side. Ivan Morgan of the Human Rights Association stated,
There is no source of funding. Because oCthe fact that we are a private, nonprofit
organization we exist on project funding and so we're constantly searching for
projects and then doing projects in order to survive.J8
However, during the 1997 referendum, as noted above, the Education First group did
receive indirect assistance from the government, such as executive assistants assigned to
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the group's headquarters to assist in the organization and running of the Yes campaign.
"Education First had at best MINOR government a5sistance," says Steve Wolinetz, "one
'suit' was involved from time 10 time, but was kind of useless."
The only Yes side group with any means was the NLTA. As Wayne Noseworthy of
the NLTA put it,
We were, this sounds a little bit self-serving 1suppose as an organization, but we
were the only organization, of any consequence, of any size, of any resource base,
and with any political influence that would havc had the ability to cause this to
happen. I mean for years the Human Rights Association would have cried foul with
respect to the what we would call the ill treatment of our members based upon
denominational bias and so on but they had no power to influence the agenda - we
did. I think we did and I think this reform would not have started as it did. It would
not have proceeded as rapidly as it did if we hadn't given it a really strong kick-start
in the late '80s. That is my personal assessment.39
For further information the following table is provided:
Table 6-2 Interest Group Finances
Groul) Yearly Bud ,et
Roman Catholic Church Unknown
An .lican Church Unknown
United Church Unknown
Pentecostal Church $17,000,000.00 I
Presb tenan Church Unknown
Salvalion Armv Unknown
Seventh-day Adventist Church Unknown
NLTA $3,000,000.00 ii
Yes Means Yes Comm No budget
iuee - Education First
Human Rights Association
Federation des parent francophones
Home and School federation
Alliance For Choice
i Pastor Earl Batstone. II Wayne Nosewonhy. III Ivan Morgan
accounts. v Eva Whitmore. vi Janet Henley-Andrews.
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No budget
Pro' eet fundin' iii
No funding until
1997 iv
$15,000.00 v
Nobude:et vi
IV lnformahon gathered from newspaper
6.3.2.2 Vulunteers
Most church work is carried on by volunteers. It was evident throughout the
education debate that the churches mobilized a number of volunteers for the purposes of
writing lellers, making phone calls to open line shows, making appearances before
government committees and gcnemllobbying of government. However, the churches
were able to rely upon paid staff to put forward their viewpoints. The executive directors
of the respective Denominational Education Councils had the time and the means to
organize the church volunteers for the public and private campaign ofinfluencing
government.
Other groups such as the Human Rights Association, Yes Means Yes Commiuee-
Education First, Parent des Francophone, Home and School Federation, Alliance For
Choice, depended totally on volunteer support. Their volunteer assistance was fluid, with
many assisting for short "spurts" at a time. However, they were dedicated - spending
many nights arguing and debating the moves for the following day.
6.3.2.3 Leaders
The effectiveness of the groups depended upon their respective kadership. The
leaders of the interest groups were committed to their organizations. Especially was that
so among the minor actors. They did not receive any remuneration for their efforts - they
were motivated by ideology, religious affiliation or lack thereof. by their own experiences
with the school system, and their own children's futures. There are times in public
matters where money ceases to be a motivator and instead passion reins as the supreme
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motivation. The passion exhibited by both the Yes and the No sides of this debate is
indicative.
1be leadership of the Integrated churches showed evidence of divided loyalties.
On the one hand, there was some desire to maintain Tenn 17 rights: )'et. on the other.
they were forced by their constituents to acquiesce to the government's demands to get
out of school administration. This "warning" by the Integratc.."t! churches caused them to
lose some credibility by, first, their own constituency and, then, later, by the other
churches, particularly the Roman Catholic and Pentecostal churches.
TIle amount oftimc interest group leaders spent on education rcfonn varied from
group to group. For instance, the leadership ofthc minor actors included teachers,
lawyers, university professors and so on - each with their own careers and
responsibilities. They simply did not ha"e the means to devote full time personnel on the
issue. The churches, especially the Roman Catholic and Pentecostal leadership, did have
full time personnel working with the refonn issue.
6.J.J Group Struclul"t
Pross argues that a group's potential for political influence increases with a strong
organizational structure. It allows the group to carry the necessary work in getting their
point across to the key government policy and decision m3kers. Pross highlights five
charncteristics that indicntc organizational strength: aggregative capacity (the ahility to
e1.1ablish internal agreement). articuJative capacity (the ability 10 communicate), strategic
capacity (the ability to forecast and plan), mobilization capacity (the ability to
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consistently contact government), and coalitional capacity (ability 10 nelwork through
regular contact with other groups).
6.3.3.1 Aggregative Capacity
The Roman Catholic, Pentecostal, and Sevenlh.day Adventist Churches each had
the abilily to maintain a fairly stable internal agreement. Of these three, the Roman
Catholic leadership had the most difficulty in reaching agreement between themselves
and the laity. "There are many Roman Catholics who do not look at church authority in
quite the same way as they used to," said Bon Fagan.40 He noted that influentiallait}' did
not support lhe church.
The Roman Catholic Church was going through its own internal struggle over the
Mount Cashcl affair involving the Christian Brothers' abuse afyoung boys and the high
profile clergy abuse cases. Gerry Fallon notes:
But even within the Catholic church itself the people themselves were tired of it all
and they were fed up with it all and they themselves, when the time came to stand
up and fight for Catholic schools, they just didn't support the church authorities in
that regard. So there was a kind of a weakening there. I mean, I think the people
felt if you can't get your own house in order and if you can't control members of
your own clergy then why should you have a right to decide on how teachers
should live, for example, you know, which was a major, certification of teachers
and determining tcacher lifestyle, and thin~s of that nature making decisions on
teacher lifestyle was a major issue as well. I
The Integrated Church leadership on the other hand had pressure from their respective
constituents for unnecessarily holding out and maintaining a power struggle with
government. Each of these churches eventually came to the realization that they could no
longer hold on to their education righlS and were willing to let them go. In speaking
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before the Senate, the Right Reverend Donald Harvey, Archbishop of the Anglican
Church, slated,
Our hope now is Ihat this bill will be passed and that the government, with its new
authority, will listen to the dictates of its people as they attempt to frame a system
which will embody the best of the past while providing for efficiency and
consolidation to meet the rapidly changing demographics of this provincc.42
The NLTA's ability to build internal agreement was strong. The NLTA executive
through its various committees and public forums focused on two central issues:
efficiency and human rights of their members. There were internal struggles as teachers
in the province were strongly committed to their churches; however, in the end. the
NLTAwas able to settle on these two issues of conccm.4J
6.3.3.2 Articulative Capacity
Since the interest groups were composed of and were lcd by professionals, they
were able to articulate their respective positions as the debate unfolded. These interest
groups made presentations to the various government committees, and were involved in
public debates, radio talk shows, and television interviews.
The Education First group, for example, could draw on a variety of professional
skills. They had the assistance of Professor Steve Wolinetz and Tom Hann during the
1997 Referendum campaign preparing press releases and other publicity work. The
churches had the ability to hire lawyers for preparation of briefs and legal opinions. The
churches and government met on a regular basis in their attempts for a negotiated
settlement. From the examination of the public records it would appear that all of the
interested parties had the ability and the means to get their points across. The media,
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especially The Evening Telegram, carried extensive coverage of the debate within its
pages - columnists both for and against had the opportunity to present their positions.
6.3.3.3 Strategic Capacity
From the beginning of 19R9-1990, at the time of the announcement of the Williams
Commission, the churches through means of the DenominationaL Education Committees
were able to strategize how to best deal with the emerging problem of government
seeking to remove their role in the school system. There were numerous strategy
meetings between the officials of the various churches meeting separately from
government. They met to organize a common front. "All oflhe denominations
representing 97 percent of the populations were on side," noted Gerry Fallon, "and did
not wish to see govemment remove constitutional rights in education at that particular
point.'.44 There were also strategy meetings among the Integrated school boards and thcir
respective churches. These boards strongly advocated for the removal of the churches
from the system and eventually the Integrated churches came to agree. An example of
this occurred with the Framework Agreement in the Spring of 1996.45
The NLTAwas strategizing throughout the 1980s and 1990s as to how to deal with
the different education reform developments.
For many minor actors, stmtegy meetings did not occur in a serious way until the
heat of tbe referendum campaigns. Especially was this so during the 1997 Referendum.
Education First strategy meetings occurred each evening. Ivan Morgan noted that each
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evening they discussed the day's events. They worked in concen with Keith Coombs
who in turn kept in lauch with Tobin and Grimes.46
6.3.3.4 Mobilization Capacity
The Roman Catholic and Pentecostal Churches used their ability to mobilize
constituents to get involved in the process. An organized campaign sought to influence
the Williams Commission - some "Three-quaners of all the briefs supponed the existing
system.'>47 The churches organized mass lettcr campaigns to the government, letters to
the editors of the local and provincial newspapers, and phone calls to the radio open line
shows. It was evident from the respondents of these churches that as time moved on their
people lost the momentum. They were simply "tired of it all" -they organized to
influence the Williams Commission, they sought influence by writing letters to the
government, they fought the 1995 Referendwn, they organized during the school
dt:signation process. and by the time they had to face another referendum in 1997, therc
was very little left.
On the Yes side, as time moved on momentwn increased. They gradually became
more organized. The members of the Integrated schools, the boards and the churches,
came to the realization that they must work harder during the 1997 Rcfcrcndum to ensure
that they "got it right." The Integrated Church leaders called on the public to vote yes. 48
During the first referendum, the NLTA stayed more on the sidelines, arguing only that
people get out and vote. By the time of the second referendum, the NLTA were
advocating that the public vote yes. The NLTA president said that (he NLTA leadership
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"felt compelled to respond to the expressed needs and concerns of its membership by
pledging support for the Yes side.'A9 Even the Liberal back benchers who had been
sympathetic to the churches in 1995 were backing the government without reservations in
1997 - obviously therc was nothing to fear from the electorate on the issue. 50
6.3.3.5 Coalitional Capacity
At the beginning of the period, i.e. 1989-90, the churches were able to present a
united front. However, as the process cominued, as presented throughout this paper. the
churches were unable to agree amongst themselves and eventually split on the Yes and
the No sides during the referenda campaigns. The Roman Catholic. Pentecostal and
Seventh-day Advemist Churches came to find themselves more and more marginalized.
They lost momentum and the ability to build coalitions.
The Education First coalition wa" an amalgam ofjust about all of the minor actors
along with some indirect support from the Newfoundland Govemmcnt. Clearly, they
were capable of building bridges - even with a number of the Integrated churches, who at
one time supported the church right to school involvement, but by 1997 were supporters
of the "Yes" side. It may be argued that this development in 1997 was a key contributor
to the success the "Yes" side achieved.
6.3.4 Grou), Outputs
Pross suggests that the outputs of a group are important for strengthening the group
itsclfand in its ability to influence the decision makers. Sl From the evidence of the
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respondents and the information on lhe public record. the churches. particularly the
Roman Catholic and Pentecostal Churches. the NLTA, and the Integrated churches and
groups had by far the greater amount of outputs. They ...."ere presenting positions at every
available opponunity. The pastoral letters from the church leaders. and articles in their
respective church newspapers. were: all an attempt to keep their memberships informed as
to the issues.
While it is difficult to gauge the success of such efforts, there were times when the
"mass letters" sent to government had a negative effect on government. Chris Decker
recalls receiving a letter from a young girl and was outraged that a child could be
"manipulated" into writing a letter for something she did not know anything about.
6.3.5 Group Goals In Education Reform
Information gathered from the respondents, the media, and the public record has
allowed me to construct the table of interest groups and their respective goals that
follows.
137
Table 6-3 Interest Group Goals
Grou Goals
Roman Catholic Church Reform while maintaining constitutional
ri hL~
Anglican Church At first rdonn while maintaining
constitutional rights-then changed to
reform without constitutional ri hts
Ullited Church At first reform while maintaining
:~srt~u~~~~~~i::~:t~t~~~n~~~~~ to
Pentecostal Church Reform while maintaining constitutional
dhts
Presbyterian Church At first reform while maintaining
oonstillltional rights-then changed to
reform withoUiconstitutional rights: but
schools maintain a "Christian character"
Salvation Army At first refonn while maintaining
constitutional rights-then changed to
refonn withoutcollstitutional rights; but
sehools maintain a "Christian character"
Sevcnth-<lay Adventist Church Reform while maintaining constitUlional
ri hts; rca itafundin for schools
NLTA Unified school system for greater efficiency
and use of resources; removal of churches
dominance over hiring and firing teachers;
not Ilcccssarilylhe removal of churches
from education
Yes Means Yes Committee Education First A single secular public school system
churchinvolvcment
Human Rights Association A single secular public school systcm
church involvement
Federation des parent francophones Recognition of right to a publicly funded
French school board
Home and School Federation Unified school systcm for grcaler efficiency
and use of resources
Alliancc For Choice Public funding of denominational schools
where such schools would be viablc
Based upon the above information, the interest groups hay!;; been placed within the
Institutional Continuum Framework on the following page:
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Strong institutional characteristics, as identified by Pross, have shown the relative
strength oflhe interested parties. While Ihe Roman Catholic and Pentecostal Churches
have to be seen as the strongest influenccrs in public policy of all the churches with the
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Term 17 rights, they '-"'ere ullimately WlSuccessful. The minor actors such as the
Education First group were less developed institutionally, but yet made a profound
impact on the debate.
Groups on the Yes side and the No side were effective in identifying and
articulating their goals and objectives in the debate. Depending on the time in the
process, one can see that most ofthc groups had considerable success in mobilizing and
building coalitions to achieve those goals. It came down [0 a horse race - with the
momentum clearly in favour of the Yes side.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
7.1 Introduction
Albie Sachs once Slated lhaL ~All revolutions are impossible until they happen:
then they become inevitable.~1 From hindsight, the removal of denominational education
in Ne\\foundland was inevitable. Many factors came together 3tthe same time for a
revolutionary change. The secular evolution of the people was having its effect- they
saw denominational education as a relic oflhe past and no longer relevant The churches,
and in particular the Catholic Church, were in disarray over the clergy abuse scandals?
Changing demographics meant that student population was declining. The economic
mood was despair in the wake of the collapse of the Northern Cod fishery. Teachers
were deploring the lack of funding for education and the lack of suppon for what they
saw as hWDan rights issues in the hiring and firing practices of the church schools. Clyde
Wells was elected with a known propensity for education refonn. All of these factors
came together to make the demise of the denominational system inevitable.
7.2 Summary of Groups Capacity to Influence Educational Policy
Presented below arc a number of perceptions, gleaned from this study, that will be
helpful for further research in the area.
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7.2.1 The Gonrnmenl's Agenda llnd Ihe Premier's Influence
A group's capacity to innuence government may be muted or enhanced by a
number of different factors. It is suggested thai the personality of the premier and his
agenda has been a major factor in the education reform. "The respondents were almost
unanimous on the significant role fonner Premier Clyde Wells played in the whole
debate. His passion for reform appeared to have been based upon his own concept of
what he thought was the right thing to do. For years, the NLTA and the Human Rights
Association have been arguing for the need to change denominational education because
of the human ril:;hts issues of the teachers. There were public forums and debates, but it
was not until the election of Clyde Wells that education reform saw the light of day.
"When he formed government he had an agenda," says Decker, "He definitely had an
agenda and education was one ofthem.",J
11k: group that shared his view would naturally feel they ....-ere being heard, .....hile
an opposing group .....ould feel ignored and insignificant. Chris Decker appears to agree
\..;th this assessment; "You kno..... I'm beginning to sound awfully arrogant, il seems Ihe
people that agreed with US we listened to and the ones .....e did not agree with w-e gave
them a couneous meeting. This is a terrible thing to say but that is what it seems like:....
7.2.2 Views of the Puhlic
A group that not only shares the views of the politic;llleaders but also the views of
the public is morc apt to obtain recognition from the government. Newfoundland society
changed drdStically over the years. The population became more educated. more
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affluent, and more secular. Churches no longer held sway over the population as they
once did - resulting in them being, as Decker put it, ';a paper tiger". Government was at
first reluctant to rilc the churches for fear ofe1ectoral dcfeat. However, by constant
polling, the government soon realized that the population was indeed ready for change,
Those groups that were in line with public opinion were more apt to have the ear of
government - as was evident with the involvement of Tobin and Grimes in the Education
First group.
The Roman Catholic, Pentecostal, and Seventh·day Adventist Churches were out of
step with the public mood, They were in a no-win situation. Government was intent on
removing the churches from the administrative functions of the school system and public
support was with the government. Nevertheless. the churches did manage to not only
slow the process with the Wells administration, but they were able to get a right to some
"unidenominational" schools in certain circumstances in the Wells Term 17 reform. That
would not have happened had it not bt:en for the Roman Catholic and Pentecostal
representations to the government.
7.2.3 Volunteer Commitment
A group may have limited resources and yet have an impact. There were a number
of groups that did not have money. lbc Human Rights Association, Home and School
Federation, Yes Means Yes Committee-Education First. and Alliance For Choice were
without secure funding yet were noticed by the media, by the government and by the
population at large. Their limited rcsources were compensated by the dedication of their
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voluntcers. Thcir members oftcn included well-respected professionals such as teachers,
lawyers, and university profe~rs who were articulate and knowledgeable as they
appeared before government officials and committees advocating their respective views
of reform.
7.2.4 PeJ1liistence
A group's persistence pays off. The NLTA's tenacity and determination to continue
the role of pushing government on refonn of the denominational education eventually
gained political traction after some twenty years. Chris Decker's view that the NLTA
cannot claim any credit for bringing about the refonn of the system in the 1990s cannot
be correct for at least thc lollowing reason: the NLTA performed what Pross calls "a
vital part in policy development."~ The conferences and study sessions sponsored by the
NLTA in the late 1980s kept before govcmmcntand the public the issue of education
reform. Without such constanl and repetitive actions. the government would not have
had the ability to make the changes when it did. Wayne Noseworthy's view bears
repeating,
We were, this sounds a little bit self-serving I suppose as an organization, but we
were the only organization, of any consequence, of any size, of any resource base,
and ....1th any political influence that would have had the ability to cause this to
happen. I mean for years the Human Rights Association would have cried foul with
respect to the what wc would call the ill treatment of our members based upon
denominational bias and so on but they had no power to influence the agenda _we
did. I think we did and I think this reform would not have started as it did. It would
not have proceeded as rapidly as it did if we hadn't given it a really strong kick-start
in the latc 'SOs. That is my personal assessment.~
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7.2.5 folitics
Pernaps, in InC end, Government is going 10 do whal Government is going 10 do.
Ivan Morgan of the Human Rights Associalion had this to say about whether they had
influenccd government:
I really don't think we have any influence. We pissed and moaned long enough. We
certainly kept it in the public agenda and we would from time 10 time talk this out to
the annoyance of whoever the minister was at the time. These people don't give a
shit about us. Jerry met with the Minister today regarding thc creation ofa dlild
advocate and they're doing this as a public relations thing. Jerry went in with a list of
revisions to their legislation and I don't think. the Minister was actually listening. I
think he was thinking about what he was going to have for lunch. We don't matter.
We're downtown rubber booters. We don't affect thcir ability to get elected and from
one human to another, whcn it comes to politicians, its getting elected and nothing
else. Thcy don't give a shit. I'll leave you with one quote. During the Education
First campaign, Roger [Grimes} came in smoking these fucking cigars that are really
obnoxious. This woman who had been volunteering with us had this issuc and she
came stonning into thc office and she cornered Roger and she started going on about
class allotments. She went on and on. She had a bunch of questions that she rattled
off to him and she said, "Well?" He gave her a little smile and he looked over to
Keith Coombs and waved his cigar and said, "Isn't that what Deputy Ministers are
for?" I'll never forget it. I laughed all the way home because it's absolutely right.
Their job is to give the public what the public thinks they want.1
7.3 Summary of Results of Education Reform
At the end of the day, the refonn of the scnool system in Newfoundland wenllike a
prairie grass wildfire. Once government brought the issue onto the public agenda. it look
a life of its own. The complexity of the forces, the interest groups, and the government's
desire for change, allIed 10 a movement that few thought would result in Ihe way it did.
Even government policies and goals appeared to develop on the fly - in the end
Newfoundland, for better or for \vorse, has a single secular public system. Churches may
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only be involved to the extent of religious education of their adhercnts - absolutely no
administrative role.
7.4 Analysis of Data
7.4.1 Group Goals and Final Results of Education Reform
Iklow is a table of the group goals and the tinal results:
Table 7-1 Interest Group Goals and Results
Grou Goals Result
Roman Catholic Church Rcfonn while mainmining cons1itutional NO! achieved _Go>'cmmeni removal
nohlS ofchurchriohts
AngJicanChurch
Prc.bytcrionChurch
SalvaTionAnny
SevenTh-da)'Advrnlisl
Church
Rcformwf1ilemainminingconslilmional
Allirst refmm while maintaining
conslilUlional rights-then changed tordorm
withoutcOOslitulional rights; bUT school.
rnainlain a "Chrislian charncl(:J"
Alfir<Tn:formwhilemainmining
cons1ituliona!rights-thencbansedTorcform
:~:itIlC:~'~~~i~~:I:~~Tschool.
Rcform ....... ilemainlain;ngcOflslitutional
ri IS: caitafundinforschools
Unified scbool sySlem for greaTer efficiency
and use of resources; rcmoval ofchurches
dominancco,'crhiringandfiringlcachcrs
nOlneces.<arilyTberemovalofehurchesfrom
cdllCat;oll
NO!achie"ed_Governmenlremoval
of church'; IS
Achieved: Chri~tian charnelerto be
Not achieved· Government removal
ofchurdtrihlS
Achievcd_beyundcxpcctaTion
Yes Means YcsCommincc A singlc secular pUblic school system-no
EducaliunFi"'t cburchin"oh'efllent
IlumanRighlsAssocialion A sinr.Je secular pUblic scbool ,ystem-no
churchinvolvcment
Feder~tion des parenT I{e\:ognition of right to a publicly funded
franco nn"" I'rcnch school board
Home and School Federation ~h~~~ ~h:~,:~~m for grcater efficic-ncy
Public funding ofdenominational school,
.....bell' 'lUCh schools would be viable
14'
7.4.2 Apparent Winners and Losers
To put the matter succinctly, the losers among the groups were those who wanted
to maintain their own separate school systems - namely,lhe Roman Catholic,
Pentecostal, and Seventh-day Adventist Churches. They, along with the Alliance for
Choice in r::ducation, were the sum total of the "No" side - and they lost their attempt to
maintain denominational schools.
The winners were certainly the "Yes" side. They obtained the single secular public
school system - conceivably it should solve the problems identified by the Williams
Commission. However, already there are some misgivings. Ivan Morgan stales that
government has made cut-backs, closed down school libraries to make more classrooms,
"classes are over-crowded, services have been cut back time and time again," fonner
Catholic schools that were run efficiently and clean are now poorly administered and
"depressing." Everyone is getting ready for a teachers strike. TetlSions are still running
high. While at a restaurant recently, Ivan was accosted by an individual, "Do you feel
responsible for the mess the school system is in?" the person asked. "No I don't," he
asserts,
They are separate issues right? First things first. Did [ know Tobin was going to
do Ihis? Oh yeah, sure. I feel sorry for some of the people that I worked with
because J think they really didn't think he'd do it. But we were too preoccupied
just getting the flyers out, handling the press, dealing with the opposition and you
know?8
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Chris Decker views il dilTerently. !'Ie says,
Sometimes people compare what is to what was, bul you can't compare what is to
""flat was. You muse compare whal is 10 what •....ould ha"e been because had ,",'C not
gOI rid of this. not necessarily denominations. had we not golten rid of this
duplication where U'C had lhree or four systems in a little province less 1han ... a
100 lhousand children. trying 10 operate three discinci or four syslems.... Had we
continued with thac. our syslem today would have been an awful 101 ,,,..orse than il is
nol saying it is pt.'ffect. righl now but il is a 101 better 1han it would have been had
we nOI had the balls to go and reform the sYSlcm.Q
Steve Wolinetz is of the view that nobody won.
The school system five years in may get back to education but there are still many,
many blockages in it. You know there are a lot of political processes where no one
wins or no one wins very much. I am happy enough to see the denominational
element gone. I am happy that basically proved thai most people did not care - you
know Ihat it was empty as a shell-I'm quite right about Ihal. .. There is no
evidence that there has been a great deal of improwmcnt in the system either-
teachers are still being burnt out because too much is being loaded on them." 10
The problems, such as not having enough leaching assistants to deal with remedial
students who are placed in the regular classroom and are frustrating the learning
experience of the students, are still there. "As much as I believe in secular edoeation,"
saysWolinetz,
fixing that would have been much more important than whatever role the
churches had because the religious element was quite fronkly innocuous. The
Depanment of English slill wished at one point that its majors would do religious
studies because sludents coming out of the so called denominational syslem knew
nothing about the Bible. It was a failure. It's explainable in the sense that
Calholics don't teach the Bible in the way the Protestanl dcnominalions might in
the content but certainly none of the Integrated Boards were particularly teaching
anything that gives anyone any knowledge ofa major, let's say clement in
understanding Western civilization but hell they don't Icach history either. I I
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7.5 Reflections on the Methodology
The naturalistic paradigm was an effective approach to study Newfoundland's
education reform process and the role of the special interest groups. By studying the
process in its natural setting, the researcher was able to explore the relationships between
the ditTerent actors. It is felt that the actors openly discussed their experience and what
they felt were the positives and tbe short+comings of education reform.
Qualitative studies art: never precise - they tend to be multifaceted and complex.
So while the theories as outlined in the begiIUling ofthis paper helped to focus and
"pigeon hole" the d..1.ta as received, it must be understood Olle had to work hard at
deciphering from all of the material what was relevant. Literally thousands of pages of
Hansard, newspapers, and discovery evidence were perused to present the analysis in as
cogent a manner as po~ible.
All the while, the researcher looked for the unforeseen, or the surprising bit of
information that shed light on the process in a new way. One such incident was the
evidence that the Clyde Wells government "cleaned house" in the Department of
Education, ensuring that those in senior positions were sympathetic to thc reform
proposals of the Williams Commission and would not hinder the process. Another was
the incident of Brian Tobin meeting clandestinely with a leader of the Human Rights
Association requesting that in the second referendum process the Association would keep
quiet about minority rights and support the government initiative to get the churches out
of education altogether. Still another was the frank admission of Chris Decker that from
the start he personally wanted the churches removed from the education system. yet
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publicly he would have to bite his tongue and say government policy was to allow church
involvement. Again, with Mr. Decker and most other respondents held the view that this
whole reform was the government's initiative, or more particularly Clyde Wells'
initiative. and that no group or groups could be credited with forcing or pressuring
govcrnmcnt to bring education reform on the public agenda. These types of things
aHowed me to get behind the public persona and hcar directly from the actors as to what
was going on.
At the same timc, there was a need to keep referring to the theoretical base of the
study to ensure that the research did nm expand beyond a manageable size. One problem
was the sheer magnitude of the subject matter. There were and still are numerous
avenues one could take for further research, as noted below.
The data for the research came from numerous sources. The section on the history
of the denominational system of education required extensive research in university
libraries. The general arguments ofthe reform debates were gleaned from the public
records of the two Houses of Parliament and the Newfoundland Legislature. The
interaction between the different actors was garnered from personal interviews. The
personal interviews proved to be very successful in allowing me the latitude necessary to
probe into the workings of the process and to answer questions raised by the other
research. As mentioned above, the interviewees appeared genuine and frank in their
responses.
The disappointment with the interview process was the inability to involve a
number of key players. At one point, the study almost abandoned the whole concept of
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conducting interviews from a broad range of respondents and considered rnurowing Lhe
study to just one interest group. However. after further effort. interviews began to
materialize. Sometimes. it took a multitude of emails and phone calls before an interview
could be amUlged. Still, there were some notable failures. such as the inability to
interview Clyde Wells. Brian Tobin, Roger Grimes. and members of the Integrated
churches. While such interviews would have cenainly shed more important light on the
matter, it ....'as not, in the end, detrimental to the study. To compensate for this. an extra
effort was made to review the public record and media accounts of what these actors said
during the refonn process between 1989-1998 to provide some balance. Yet, as the
interviews showed, what individuals said to the media during the rcfonn debate was often
not the who1e story.
Positivist critics note that qualitative research has validity and reliability problems.
The researcher was cognizant of these potential charges. yet feci confident that while this
study may not be replicated. there arc genera.l inferences lhat can be drawn from the
presented material. One of the goals of this rcscart:h was to assist those interested in
influencing public policy in education. It is argued thai that was accomplished. Such
lobbyists may well find lhe infonnation presented in this study vcry infonnative as to the
type of approach they may want to usc in getting math~rs on the public agenda. While no
two situations can be the same, certainly general implications can be drav,'O.
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7.6 Reflections on the Theory
Thc framework of this study was based on the work of Pross in the area of policy
communities. His Institutionalization Continuum allowed the researcher to consider the
different characteristics of the interest groups and their relative potential to influence the
public JXllicy in education. One problem with Pross's work that became evident early on
in the study was that his policy community was based on the Canadian federaJ
government. In applying the model to a provincial level, onc could see some
discrepancies. First, Pross noted that the Federal Cabinet was the final decision-maker.
While that was also true on the provincial level, in this case it did not adequately address
thl:: situation where there is a strong personality in the office of Premier. Clyde Wells
was seen as the catalyst placing the education refonn on the public agenda. It was Jor all
intents and purposes "his baby." "He introduced it," said Decker. The dominant role ofa
provincial premier may, in fact, be much different from a comparable role at the federal
level. The provincial "pond" or policy community is a much smaller community,
perhaps more apt to be intimidated by a stronger personality. Second, Pross's framework
envisions a lot more organized groups than what was evident here. The different groups
that sprung up in the refonn process were under-financed, under-staffed, and often left in
the dark as to what the provincial government was doing. The church groups with a long
standing as part of the subgovemment did appear to have the personnel and the resources
to challenge government policy.
Nevertheless, Pross's work was extremely helpful in assisting me to study the
phenomenon of the education refonn process of the 199Os. It very much anchored the
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study into a well-defined method of analysis allowing for future studies to carry this work
forward.
7.7 Future Research
Working on this thesis presented ideas for further study. One is the need for
analysis of the referenda proccss. Thcre wcre a number of issues such as government
funding, the role of the media, the lack of any clear "ground rules" as to the timing of
when the question should be made public, and other legislative initiatives relying on the
results of the referenda. Perhaps, such a study could be undertaken, leading to a
legislative framework for further plebiscites and referenda in the province.
Two, while this research took a vel)' broad approach to the refoon process, further
study should btl taken to analyze individual interest groups in greater depth. This study
has presented a superficial view of the different interest groups in the process. Other
studies may want to centre one group and analyze their role in the education retonn The
one that comes to mind is the NLTA.
Finally, this thesis is limited in that members of the Integrated churches were not
interviewed. Some did not respond \0 my requests for interviews and others refused to
participate. It would be of great interest to study their struggles in the debate. They had
supported church rights in the first instance, only to back away from that position by the
timc of the second referendum. Surely, they had intemal struggles that would help shed
light un this whole process.
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7.8 Conclusion: Research Question Answered
At the beginning of the study, the basic question asked was, "What interest groups
had the primary influence on the Newfoundland goverrunent's move to refonn Ihe
educational system?" Surprisingly enough, it was concluded that, while interest groups,
particularly the NLTA. had a long history of lobbying government for reform of the
system, it was not until Clyde Wells, a polilicalleader with a particular view of what was
in the best interests of the public, came on the scene that government mustered the
courage to deal with it. It was no easy feat for Wells 10 raise the matter for discussion.
The very facl that he look a cautious approach in his dealings wilh the churches is
evidence of his legitimate fear of what the churches could do politicaJly to his career as
premier.
Some may criticize the conclusion, since II suggests that an interest group's ability
10 influence governmcnt policy depends more on whether the group is in sync with the
government view. However, that is not what is being said. Rather, the study confinns,
Pross's general observations that a group's level of institutionalization is a good indicator
of a group's ability to influence government, but not, perhaps in the same way as Pross
would see it.
The education reform process confinns Pross's view of the role interest groups
havc in challenging government policy by means of conferences, seminars, and briefs
creating a means of discussion a~ to reform. This can be seen by the pro-active role the
NlTA played in thc 1980s and their "Exploring New Pathways" documents and
seminars. We also have to move Pross's view funher, at least in this case. There can be
1S6
no doubt that politiealleaclership was a major, ifnot the major, development in the early
1990s that brought education reform to the public agenda. And it is here that Graesser's
view of the churches being the gatekeepers eomes into play.
If, as Graesser maintains, the churches had a gatekeeper role, why didn't they use
their role to keep the matter off the agenda? This research shows that they tried, but
government refused to budge: it was going to be on the agenda period. Those in the
Department of Education who did not support or were perceived to hinder the move
towards reform were moved on. 12 Again, political leadership came into play. While
Wells publicly maintained a confident stance against the churches, he was reluctant 10
move 100 fast, but he was going to move because he felt it was the right thing to do
or course, from hindsight, one could say it was inevitable. The churches were "on
the ropes" because of the sexual abuse scandals of the late 1980s; the NLTA and the
Hwnan Rights Association were constantly in media opposing the way leachers' lifestyles
were factors in their employment with church schools; and the public had become
secular. The church, it may be claimed. had become "paper tigers", no longer capable of
playing the gatekeeper of public policy in education. In addition, government members
were former NLTA presidents or executives, the economy was at a standstill, and student
enrollment was falling and resources dwindling. All these things came together as ifand
explosive mist. Premier Clyde Wells was the "champion spark plug," igniting Ihc
passions that ultimately led to the removal of churches from the Ncv,foundland school
system.
1S7
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APPENDIX A
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR GOVERNMENT INTERVIEWEES
BACKGROUND:
I am studying the influences on the policy-making process of interest groups in
Newfoundland on thc issuc ofthc educational reform of the 1990s (up to an including the
"Second Referendum") for my Master of Arts dissertation in the Faculty of PoliticaJ
Science at Memorial University. Your willingness to assist me in my research is
invaluable and very much appreciated. The qualitative research method is being used as
opJXlsed to tbe quantitative research method.
What would you identify as the major issues during the educational reform of the 1990s?
EXTERNAL INFLUENCES:
Would you outline your involvement inlknowledge of information for the decision-
making process in the Provincial Government on the matters of the education reform?
What was your role in the process
What were your department's responsibilities and goals during the education
reform debate
Were those goals achieved
What are your responsibilities as "minister" (and "deputy minister" etc)
What sources do you use to familiarize your self with a policy issue - any outside
organization that you used for fonnation of educational policy?
POLITICAL PROCESS:
Could you outline the process that le<lds 10 policy recommendations/decisions for the
education department?
Who determines the agenda
How were decisions made
Who made the decisions
How did this process work during the education debate
Was that process typical of most decision-making within the department
POLITICAL CONTEXT:
Who waslhas been involved in discussions, recommendations and decisions
To what degree arc/were they involved
What groups were seeking to influence policy on education refonn
[fyou put the primary decision makers in the eenler- where would you place other
players in the process in relation to the decision makers and to each other?
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government agencies; public interest groups etc. (here is a partial list of interest groups
that gave evidence before the Senate Constitutional Commiltee holding hearings on the
educational referendum:
Pentecostal Assemblies of Ncwfoundland;
Seventh-day Adventist Church in Newfoundland & Labrador;
Roman Catholic Church;
Integrated School Boards;
Anglican Church;
Presbyterian Church;
Salvation Army;
United Church;
Fcderntion des parent francophoncs dc Tcrrc-Neuve et du Labrador;
"Yes Means Yes" Committee;
Newfoundland and Labrador Homc and School Federation;
Newfoundland and Labrador Teachers' Association;
Newfoundland and Labrador Human Rights Association;
Labrador Metis Association;
Official Opposition of Newfoundland and Labrador; (the political
parties are not interest groups however I am interested in your view ofthe role
they played during the relorm debates)
New Democratic Party of Newfoundland and Labrador; (the political
parties are not interest groups however I am interested in your view of the role
they played during the reform debates)
St. .Iohn's Board ofTradc;
Alliance for Choice in Education
Parents and Studcnts
what groups arc/were particularly influential in educational policy - and why
do you think they are successful or no longer successful
GROUP CHARACTERISTICS:
It is important for my study to determine the relationship the provincial government had
with the various groups.
How would you describe "each of the interest groups listed above" with respect to the
following characteristics:
si7.e
membership
finances
expertise with issues
degree of influence
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STRATEGIES:
Would you describe your relationship with members of "the different groups"
how do/did you come into contact with the members
how were you made aware of "X group"
how much contact do/did you have with "X group"
what issues do/did you discuss with them
in policy discussions on education reform where did "X group" become
involved
OUTCOME:
What did you do with the infonnationlrcqucst/proposal on education refonn brought to
you by "X group".
arc there any of "X group's" proposals reflected in the education reform or
final decisions
- ill your opinion how significant has "X group's" role been in education reform
policy process
As you look to education issues ahead. what role do you think groups like "X group" will
play in the future'?
- what do you think that "X group" could do to be more effective
WRAPUP:
Is there anything that you would like to add'?
Who would you suggest that I talk to in order to gain a full appreciation of factors and
groups that influenced education reform policy?
Are there any docwnents I would find relevant?
May I contact you if I have further questions? What would be the best way to contact
)·ou'1
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APPENDIX U
lNTERVIEW QUESTIONS fOR INTEREST GROUP INTERVlEWEES
BACKGROUND:
What would you idemify as the major issues during the educational reform of the 1990s?
EXTERNAL INFLUEI'lCES:
Would )'ou outline your involvement inlknowlcdge of information for the decision-
making process in the educational reform?
What was your role in the process
What were your group's responsibilities and goals during the education refonn
debate
Were those gools achieved
What are your responsibilities as "member" of your group
What sourees do you use to familiarize your sclfwith a policy issue - any outside
organization?
POLITICAL PROCESS:
Could you outline the process that leads to poliey recommendations/decisions on
education?
Who determines the agenda
How '"Iere decisions made
Who made the decisions
How did this process work during the education debate
Was that process typical of most decision-making
As you see it did the government have its own set of goals or objectives in regard
to the educational reform that it ....'31lted to see
POLITICAL CONTEXT:
Who has been involved in discussions, recommendations and decisions
To what degree are they involved
What groups were seeking to influence JXIlicy on education reform
'fyou put the primary decision makers in the center - where would you place other
players in the process in relation to the decision makers and to each other?
government agencies; public interest groups etc. (here is a partial list of imcrcst groups
that gave evidence before the Senate Constitutional Committee holding hearings on the
educational referendum:
Pentecostal Assemblies of Newfoundland:
Scnnth-day Adventist Cburch in Newfoundlilnd & Llibrador;
169
Roman Catholic Church;
Integrated School Boards;
Anglican Church;
Presbyterian Church;
Salvation Army;
United Church;
Federation des parent francophoncs de Terre-Neuve et du Labrador;
"Yes Means Yes" Committee;
Newfoundland and Labrador lIome and School Federation;
Newfoundland and Labrador Teachers' Association;
Newfoundland and Labrador Human Rights Association;
Labrador Metis Association;
Official Opposition of Newfoundland and Labrador; (the political
parties are not interest groups however I am interested in your view ofthe role
they played during the refonn debates)
New Democratic Party of Newfoundland and Labrador; (the political
parties are not interest groups however [ am interested in your view of the role
they played during the reform debates)
St. John's Board of Trade;
Alliance for Choice in Education
Parents and Students)
what groups are particularly influential- and why do you think they arc
succt':ssful
GROUP CHARACTERISTICS:
Please reft':r to cach of the groups memioncd above.
How would you describe "X group"
size
membership
finances
expertise with issues
degree of influence
STRATEGIES:
Would you describe your relationship with members of "X group"
how do you come into contact with the members
how were you made aware of"X b'1"OUP"
how much contact do you have with "X group"
what issues do you discuss with them
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• in policy discussions on education reform where did "X group" become
involved
OlITCOME:
What did you do with the informalionlrequestlproposal on education reform brought 10
you by k-X: group"',
are there any of "X group's" proJXIsals reflected in the educalioo refonn or
fioaJ decisions
- in your opinion how significant has"X group's'" role been in education reform
policy process
As you look to education issues ahead, ",lIal role do you think groups like "X group" will
play in the fUlure?
- what do you Ihink that "X group" could do to be more effective
WRAPUP:
Is there anything that you would like to add?
Who would you suggest that I talk to in order to gain a full appreciation of factors and
groups thaI intluenced education reform policy?
Are there any documents I would find relevant?
May I contact you if I have further questions? What would be the best way to contact
you?
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